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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appel1ee/Respondent, : 
v, : 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, : Case No. 880161 
Priority No. 1 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant/Petitioner, Ralph Leroy Menzies, files this 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See Cumminqs v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1912) 
(petition for rehearing is appropriate where the appellate court has 
overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied relevant facts or law); 
Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) (same). 
Menzies continues to maintain that the issues raised in 
Points I through XXXIV of his opening and reply briefs require that 
his conviction be reversed and/or that a new penalty hearing be held 
in his case. In addition, Appellant/Petitioner Menzies maintains 
that the issues raised in his briefs which this Court did not 
address are meritorious and asks that this Court address all such 
issues in its opinion regardless of whether Appellant has 
specifically addressed the issue in this Petition for Rehearing. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I, Challenge for Cause 
This Court should grant rehearing on the challenges for 
cause issue because (1) the reversibility rule of Crawford v. 
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), is the "better" rule and has 
been followed more often and more consistently by this Court than 
the "Hopt rule"; (2) the majority of jurisdictions does not require 
that a biased juror sit in order to establish bias; (3) the Crawford 
rule was in effect at the time of Mr. Menzies' trial and applying 
this new rule to Menzies violated due process, the Sixth Amendment, 
equal protection and other constitutional provisions; and 
(4) Menzies was prejudiced by the trial judge's erroneous failure to 
grant his challenges for cause since two biased jurors challenged by 
Menzies for cause sat on his jury, Menzies made a record of his 
dissatisfaction with the seated jurors, and Menzies argued that 
death qualification results in a guilt prone jury. 
Point II. Reasonable Doubt Instruction 
The failure to adequately instruct the jury as to the 
concept of reasonable doubt results in a due process and Sixth 
Amendment violation. Pursuant to Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), such an error is never 
harmless because "there has been no jury verdict within the meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment.11 
- 2 -
Point III. Prison File—Unreliable Reports 
The double and triple hearsay reports in the prison file 
created the same type of unreliable sentencing proceedings as that 
which occurred in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 
1993) . This due process and Eighth Amendment violation requires a 
new penalty hearing. 
Point IV. Admission of Prison File Not Harmless 
The number and type of reports in the prison file preclude 
its erroneous admission from being considered "harmless." 
Point V. Heinousness Aggravator 
The record in this case demonstrates that the trial judge 
relied on the heinousness aggravator. He explicitly referred to 
that aggravating factor and made an effort to ascertain the correct 
subsection number when discussing it. Reference to the subsection 
by number would have been unnecessary and irrelevant if the judge 
were not relying on the circumstance. The ability of the trial 
judge to consider the nature and circumstances of the crimes does 
not remove the prejudicial impact of his reliance on an improper 
factor in weighing circumstances. 
Point VI. Pecuniary Gain 
This Court's recent decision in Parsons v. Barnes, 230 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 10-11 (Utah 1994), establishes that the trial judge 
improperly relied on the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. 
- 3 -
This Court should address this issue in its opinion and hold that 
the improper consideration of this factor alone, or in conjunction 
with the improper heinousness aggravator, requires a new penalty 
phase. 
Point VII. Victim Impact 
Menzies argued that the admission of victim impact evidence 
violated the Eighth Amendment and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2). 
This Court should reconsider its resolution of this issue in light 
of its decision in State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 32-33 
(Utah 1994). 
Point VIII. Prosecutor Argument 
This Court should address Appellant's claims that the 
prosecutor's argument that Menzies should be given the death penalty 
because otherwise he might escape or be paroled was improper. The 
emotional impact of this type of argument and the frequency with 
which it is apparently made in capital cases in Utah (see State v. 
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 421 fn.4 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., concurring 
and dissenting)) demonstrate the prejudicial effect of such an 
argument and suggest that guidance is needed from this Court. 
OPINION 
On March 29, 1994, this Court issued its Opinion in 
State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1994) (Case No. 880161). 
A copy of the Opinion is contained in Appendix A. 
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TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions is contained in Appendix B: 
Rule 18(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Eighth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS 
DECISION TO CREATE A NEW REVERSIBILITY RULE FOR 
ERRONEOUS DENIALS OF CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
In State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 1994), 
this Court overruled the reversibility rule applicable to trial 
judge errors in denying challenges for cause which had been set 
forth in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), and its 
progeny, and created a new rule requiring a defendant to 
"demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was 
partial or incompetent." Id. at 24. 
Mr. Menzies requests that this Court reconsider the 
resolution of his challenges for cause issue as follows: 
(1) Appellant requests that this Court reconsider its decision to 
reject the Crawford rule because this Court has followed the 
Crawford rule more often and more consistently than the rule 
articulated in People v. Hopt, 9 P. 407 (Utah 1886), aff'd., 120 
U.S. 430, 442 (1887); (2) assuming this Court continues to reject 
the Crawford rule, Mr. Menzies requests that this Court clarify that 
- 5 -
a defendant can establish prejudice by demonstrating that s/he would 
have used an additional peremptory challenge; (3) Mr. Menzies 
requests that this Court reconsider applying the newly articulated 
rule to his case since his lawyers followed the Crawford rule which 
was in effect at the time of trial; and (4) Mr. Menzies requests 
that this Court reconsider its determination that he was not 
prejudiced since two biased jurors challenged by Menzies for cause 
sat on the jury, Menzies made a record of his dissatisfaction with 
the jury which was seated, and Mr. Menzies argued that death 
qualification results in a guilt prone jury. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DECISION TO 
REJECT THE CRAWFORD RULE. 
1. This Court Has Followed the Crawford Rule 
More Often and More Consistently Than It Followed 
the Hopt Rule. 
This Court resurrected the 1886 territorial decision in 
People v. Hoptf 9 P. 407 (Utah 1886), as the historical basis for 
its change in procedure, pointing out that in Hopt/ the Court stated: 
[A] perfect answer to the point raised is that of 
the three jurors challenged two were not sworn. 
One was challenged peremptorily by the defendant, 
and one by the people. Whether, therefore, the 
challenges were properly denied or not, they did 
not sit as jurors; the defendant was not 
prejudiced by the ruling. 
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. The Hopt Court provided no 
analysis supporting this alternative basis for affirming the death 
sentence. In addition, the Hopt Court pointed out that it was "of 
the opinion that the jurors were competentfff and that fl[t]he 
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opinions they had formed were not such as would disqualify them 
under our statutes." Hopt, 9 P. at 407 (emphasis added). In other 
words, the trial judge did not err in Hopt in denying the challenges 
for cause. In addition, the defendant did not make specific 
challenges as required and the court therefore was unable to review 
them. Hopt, 9 P. at 408. Given the fact that no error occurred in 
denying challenges for cause in Hopt, the discussion in Hopt as to 
the standard for reversal was unnecessary. 
Any persuasive force of Hopt is further undermined by the 
fact that the defendant did not use three of his peremptory 
challenges. In other words, Hopt did not sacrifice a peremptory 
challenge in order to remove the challenged jurors.1 Hence, the 
dicta from Hopt quoted in Merizies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25, 
provides little support for overruling the modern day Crawford rule. 
Following the Hopt decision in 1886, this Court articulated 
the Hopt reversibility rule only five times before embracing the 
automatic reversibility rule 89 years later in Crawford v. Manning, 
542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975). See VanWagoner v. Union Pacific 
1. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the issue 
in Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436 (1887), and determined that 
reversal was not required because: 
The challenges for implied bias fell, as there 
was no specification of the grounds for such 
challenges, as required by § 242 of the Act of 
1878. 
Hopt at 436. In addition, the Court pointed out that the defendant 
had not used all of his peremptory challenges. 
- 7 -
Railroad, 186 P.2d 293, 298-99 (Utah 1947); State v. Cano2, 228 P. 
563, 568 (Utah 1924); State v, Thorne3, 126 P. 286, 291 (Utah 1912); 
State v, Poe4, 471 P.2d 870 (Utah 1970); State v. Bautista5, 514 
P.2d 530 (Utah 1973). 
Only Thorne made any attempt to analyze the basis of the 
rule. The Thorne Court explained that although none of the 
challenges for cause should have been granted, the failure to 
challenge the final juror precluded reversal. The procedure for 
seating a juror when Thorne was tried required that parties 
challenge a juror immediately after he was voir dired. The 
defendant used his final challenge during the seating of Juror 11 
and did not make a record regarding the unacceptability of 
Juror 12. Relying on the procedure for seating a jury, the Thorne 
Court reasoned that "[i]f appellant had any personal or other 
objection to the juror, he should have indicated it then and 
there." 126 P. at 292. 
In VanWagoner, with little analysis, the Court reaffirmed 
2. In Cano, the defendant did not use all of his peremptories. 
3. In Thorne, the defendant did not have grounds for a challenge 
for cause. 
4. In Poe, 471 P.2d at 871, the court indicated that the trial 
judge had been "meticulous" in striking biased jurors. 
5. In Bautista, 514 P.2d at 532, the court did not address whether 
the juror should have been removed for cause. Instead, the court 
resolved the issue by stating, "[n]o claim is made by the defendants 
that by reason of the court's failure to excuse the prospective 
juror they had challenged they were compelled to use the peremptory 
challenge they might have used to strike another prospective juror's 
name from the list." 
- 8 
Thorne even though the procedure for picking a jury had changed.6 
By contrast to the Hopt line of cases, this Court and the 
Court of Appeals followed the Crawford reversibility rule over 25 
times in the 19-year period from when the rule was implemented until 
it was overruled in the instant case. Indeed, this Court reaffirmed 
the rule despite the fact that the State made a Ross challenge 
similar to that in the instant case. See, e.g., State v. Gotschall, 
782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1989); State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 343, 395-6. Furthermore, in 
Young, a capital case tried after the instant case and decided while 
Menzies was on direct appeal, this Court applied the Crawford 
reversibility rule and afforded Mr. Young a new trial based in part 
on the trial judge's failure to grant one of Young's challenges for 
cause.7 
Hence, a review of Utah case law regarding challenges for 
cause reveals that Crawford and its progeny are on firmer ground and 
have been applied more consistently than the short Hopt line of 
cases. 
6. VanWagoner and Bautista appear to be the only two cases of the 
six where the Court arguably may have been persuaded that the 
defendant had a good challenge for cause. Although the Court did 
not state directly that the challenge should have been granted, it 
did not state that the juror was "competent11 or without bias as it 
stated in Hopt, Thorne and Poe. 
7. Allowing Mr. Young to benefit from the Crawford rule and obtain 
a new trial while not allowing Mr. Menzies the same treatment 
violates Menzies' right to equal protection and due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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2. The Crawford Rule Represents a Fairer 
Approach to Jury Selection and Recognizes the 
Importance of Peremptory Challenges and 
Challenges for Cause. 
As Menzies pointed out in his reply brief, the Crawford 
rule protects important rights. The peremptory challenge has fl/very 
old credentials7" and is fl,one of the most important of rights 
secured to the accused.'" State v. Huerta, 855 P.2d 776, 779 (Ariz. 
1993). Various courts have recognized that requiring a defendant to 
show prejudice in order to preserve a challenge for cause would 
severely undermine the value of peremptory and for cause 
challenges. See State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 1989); 
State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990); State v. Bennett, 382 
S.E.2d 322 (W.Va. 1989). 
In Sexton, the court pointed out that "adoption of such a 
harmless error test would inevitably lead to bizarre results" and 
create a "Hobson's choice" for a defendant faced with a juror who 
should be stricken for cause. In Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d at 193, the 
court recognized that applying a harmless error test to erroneous 
denials of challenges for cause "would severely dilute the value of 
the peremptory challenges." And the Huerta Court concluded: 
Requiring a party to show separate prejudice when 
a trial judge erroneously fails to remove a 
biased juror would effectively eviscerate the 
right to peremptory challenges []. The prejudice 
of having one less peremptory challenge than the 
other side is enough to mandate reversal. 
Huerta, 855 P.2d at 781. 
Rule 18(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
each party is entitled to ten peremptory challenges in a capital 
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case; Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for 
challenges for cause. In State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 
1977), this Court explained that requiring the defendant to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed 
for cause violated the statutory scheme which provided for both such 
types of challenges. See also State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802 
(Utah 1977) (explaining that a defendant is entitled to use all of 
his peremptory challenges provided by statute, and that where a 
defendant is forced to use peremptory challenges on jurors who 
should have been removed for cause, the defendant is deprived of 
some of his statutorily mandated peremptory challenges). 
Candor in the law and a criminal defendant's right to due 
process and a fair jury trial is best served by requiring trial 
judges to remove biased jurors who are challenged for cause and to 
err on the side of removing questionable jurors rather than allowing 
them to remain on the panel, as seems to be the current practice. 
See Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. By changing the rule to 
require prejudice, this Court essentially gives a message to trial 
judges that they can deny valid challenges for cause without 
impunity. 
In the present case, Menzies was deprived of five of the 
peremptory challenges to which he was entitled under Rule 18. By 
contrast, the State was able to exercise five more peremptory 
challenges than Menzies. Depriving Menzies of these challenges 
violated his right to due process and a fair jury trial. 
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B. ASSUMING THIS COURT RETAINS ITS NEW RULE 
REQUIRING PREJUDICE, IT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT A 
DEFENDANT CAN ESTABLISH PREJUDICE BY SHOWING THAT 
HE WOULD HAVE USED AN ADDITIONAL PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE. 
1. A Majority of Jurisdictions Does Not Require 
That a Biased Juror Sit in Order to Preserve a 
Challenge for Cause. 
Both this Court and the State claim that a majority of the 
states require prejudice. State's brief at 47-9; State v. Menzies# 
235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. In Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d at 193, the Court 
questioned the State's claim in that case that a majority of 
jurisdictions embraced the prejudice requirement. A review of the 
cases cited by the State for its majority argument establishes that 
some of those cases actually follow a rule similar to the Crawford 
rule; e.g., Williams v. Comm., 415 S.E.2d 856, 860 (Va. App. 1992) 
(a trial court erred in not excluding jurors for cause "and the 
error was not cured by the fact that three of the four were struck 
by counsel"); Comm. v. Susi, 477 N.E.2d 995 (Mass. 1985) ("erroneous 
denial of the right to exercise a proper peremptory challenge is 
reversible error without a showing of prejudice."). 
Others do not clearly support the State's position. See 
Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ind. 1990) (defendant had not 
used all of his peremptory challenges so no reversible error); 
State v. Graham, 780 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Haw. 1989) (Court determines 
challenged juror not biased; footnote points out that juror did not 
sit and cites Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 
L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), without discussion); Comm. v. Ingram, 591 A.2d 
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734 (Pa. Super. 1991) (same); State v. Mayberry, 807 P.2d 86, 98 
(Kan. 1991) (jurors not biased and defendant did not use peremptory 
challenges on them; they sat on jury); Sharp v. State, 837 P.2d 718, 
727 (Alaska App. 1992) (defendant failed to use all of his 
peremptories); People v. Johnson, 842 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1992) (defendant 
did not exhaust peremptories and expressed no dissatisfaction with 
jury). 
In addition, the majority of the cases cited by the State 
which require prejudice, require only that the defendant make a 
showing that he would have used an additional peremptory challenge 
and not that an impartial juror actually sat. See, e.g., Poet v. 
Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital, 445 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Mich. 
1989); State v. Noltie. 786 P.2d 332, 335 (Wash. App. 1990); 
State v. Barnville, 445 A.2d 298, 301 (R.I. 1983); Lee v. State, 743 
P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d 222, 224 (Vt. 
1992); Trotter v. State. 576 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1990); Thompson v. 
State, 721 P.2d 1290 (Nev. 1986); State v. Adcock, 310 S.E.2d 587, 
594 (N.C. 1983); State v. Blue Thunder, 466 N.W.2d 613, 620 (S.C. 
1991); Jones v. State. 833 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992). 
Indeed, only eight jurisdictions cited by the State appear 
to require that an impartial juror actually sit in order to preserve 
an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause. Pickens v. State, 783 
S.W.2d 341, 345 (Ark. 1990); State v. Pelletier. 552 A.2d 805 (Conn. 
1989); Dawson v. State. 581 A.2d 1078, 1094 (Del. 1990); State v. 
Ramos, 808 P.2d 1313 (Idaho 1991); People v. Harris. 596 N.E.2d 
1363, 1365-66 (111. App. 1992); Ferrell v. State. 475 P.2d 825, 828 
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(Okla. Crim. App. 1970); State v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or. 
App. 1984); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 329 (Tenn. 1992), 
cert, granted, 113 S.Ct. 1840 (1993). 
Hence, a majority of jurisdictions does not require that a 
biased juror sit in order to preserve the erroneous denial of a 
challenge for cause. Instead, the majority of jurisdictions 
requires no showing of prejudice or that the defendant show s/he 
would have used an additional peremptory challenge. Utah should not 
join the small group of jurisdictions which require that a biased 
juror sit in order to preserve a challenge for cause. To do so 
"would effectively eviscerate the right to peremptory challenges" as 
well as the important role played by challenges for cause in the 
jury selection process. See Huerta, 855 P.2d at 781; Santelli, 621 
A.2d at 224-5. 
2. Prior Utah Case Law Applying the "Hopt Rule" 
Did Not Require That a Biased Juror Sit in Order 
to Preserve a Challenge for Cause. 
This Court concluded that: 
even if the trial court erred in failing to 
remove those prospective jurors whom Menzies 
found objectionable, that error was harmless. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Menzies has not 
asserted that he faced a partial or biased jury 
during the guilt phase of his trial or that the 
jury was made more likely to convict as a result 
of "death qualifying" the jury. Cf. State v. 
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 342, 386-95, 414-17 (Utah 
1993). Furthermore, while the bulk of Menzies' 
objections to potential jurors revolved around 
those individuals' views on the death penalty, 
the penalty phase was tried to the court rather 
than to the jury. 
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nzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. 
The precise standard for reversal or the type of record 
quired to show that the error was not harmless is not clear from 
as passage. A review of pre-Crawford case law suggests that under 
le Hopt line of cases, a defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous 
mial of a challenge for cause, not only when a juror who should 
ive been removed for cause sat, but also when a defendant indicated 
lat he had a "personal objection" to or would have used a 
eremptory challenge on one of the sitting jurors. See, e.g., 
anWagoner, 186 P.2d at 297 (stating that to show prejudice, 
efendant must show that "an objectionable juror was forced upon him 
fter his peremptory challenges were exhausted, and whom he would 
ave removed from the panel by challenging him peremptorily if his 
thallenges had not been exhausted); Thorne, 126 P. at 291 (same);8 
Jautista, 514 P.2d at 532 ("[n]o claim was made by the defendants 
:hat by reason of the court's failure to excuse the prospective 
juror they had challenged they were compelled to use the peremptory 
challenge they might have used to strike another prospective juror's 
name from the list"). 
As previously outlined, many jurisdictions require only 
that a defendant make a showing that he was dissatisfied with the 
jury or would have used a peremptory challenge on a sitting juror. 
8. In Cano, 228 P. at 568, the defendant did not use all his 
peremptory challenges and all objectionable jurors were removed. In 
Poe, 471 P.2d at 870, the court determined that the trial judge did 
not err in refusing to strike jurors for cause. The Poe court did 
not address the prejudice standard. 
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See State v. Barnvillef 445 A.2d at 301 (to show prejudice, 
defendant must exhaust peremptories and "bring to the attention of 
the trial justice that he is unsatisfied with the makeup of the 
jury"); State v. Adcockf 310 S.E.2d at 594 (to show prejudice, 
defendant "must (1) exhaust his peremptory challenges and 
(2) thereafter assert his right to challenge peremptorily an 
additional juror. [citation omitted]"; Poet v. Traverse City 
Osteopathic Hospital, 445 N.W.2d at 121 (to show prejudice, 
"aggrieved party" must exhaust all peremptories and "demonstrate the 
desire to excuse another objectionable juror"); Sharp v. State, 837 
P.2d at 723 (for reversal, defendant must show "that he has 
exhausted his peremptory challenges and . . . " an objectionable 
juror sat); Thompson v. State, 721 P.2d at 1291 (defendant must 
demonstrate "that any other jurors proved unacceptable or would have 
been excused had an additional peremptory challenge been available); 
State v. Blue Thunder, 466 N.W.2d at 620 (for reversal, defendant 
must use all of peremptory challenges and show that he would have 
used another peremptory); State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d at 224 
(reversible "error to 'force a defendant to use his last peremptory 
challenge to exclude a juror challengeable for cause); State v. 
Noltie, 786 P.2d at 335 (suggesting that a request for an additional 
peremptory challenge establishes prejudice); Lee v. State, 743 P.2d 
at 298 (to show prejudice, juror must exhaust peremptories and 
designate sitting juror against whom he would have used a peremptory 
challenge); Jones v. Statey 833 S.W.2d at 123 (reversible error 
where defendant is refused additional peremptory challenges and 
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ror sat against whom defendant would have used a peremptory 
Lallenge); Trotter v, State, 576 So.2d at 692 (juror whom defendant 
>uld have stricken peremptorily must sit). 
In Santelli, the Court declined to require a defendant to 
low actual prejudice, pointing out that such a rule would make 
rroneous denials of challenges for cause unreviewable. 
If we were to accept the actual prejudice rule, 
the trial court's errors would become 
unreviewable because the focus of the appellate 
inquiry would not be on the court's error, but on 
the qualifications of the juror subject to the 
lost peremptory challenge. 
21 A.2d at 224-5. 
The majority of jurisdictions does not require that a 
)iased juror sit in order to preserve a challenge for cause. A 
lumber of jurisdictions recognizes that challenges for cause will 
lave no continuing viability if such a requirement is imposed. 
4r. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court clarify that a 
defendant can establish prejudice by exhausting his peremptories, 
requesting an additional peremptory which is refused, and making a 
record that he would have used an additional peremptory challenge if 
allowed. 
C. THE NEW RULE FOR PRESERVING CHALLENGES FOR 
CAUSE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO MENZIES' CASE. 
At the time of Appellant's trial, use of a peremptory 
challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause 
required reversal. See Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091; State v. 
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Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). Appellant preserved his 
challenges for cause as required by then existing procedural rules. 
1. The Procedure Introduced in Menzies Creates a 
Procedural Bar Which Violates Due Process. 
In June 1988, after the trial in the present case, the 
United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ross v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). For almost six 
years following the opinion in Ross, Utah has maintained its 
automatic reversibility rule. 
In Ross, the Court held that Oklahoma's firmly entrenched 
procedural rule which required that a defendant use all of his 
peremptory challenges and that the biased juror actually sit did not 
violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments. The Court did not 
decide the broader question whether, in the absence of Oklahoma's 
limitation on the "right" to exercise peremptory challenges, "a 
denial or impairment" of the exercise of peremptory challenges 
occurs if the defendant uses one or more challenges to remove jurors 
who should have been excused for cause." Ross v. Oklahomaf 487 U.S. 
at 91 n.4. Ross is therefore not controlling in this case where no 
procedure similar to that in Oklahoma exists. Because the Utah 
reversibility rule in effect at the time of the Menzies trial 
required that a defendant use a peremptory challenge to remove a 
for cause juror, this Court answered an even broader question than 
the one left open in Ross. 
In Menzies, this Court decided the unresolved question in 
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ss, but went a step further since not only did the Oklahoma 
versibility rule not exist in Utah at the time of Menzies' trial, 
it a distinct rule did exist. See Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 
)91 and its progeny. By applying a new rule which creates a 
rocedural bar to substantive review of this issue, this Court 
Lolated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, due process and equal 
rotection. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 
.Ed.2d 935 (1991). 
In Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, the United States Supreme 
ourt held that applying Georgia's newly enacted contemporaneous 
bjection rule for preserving claims under Batson v. Kentucky to a 
iefendant whose case was tried before enactment of the rule violated 
lue process. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on its 
>rior case law which established that a state procedural rule which 
lad not been announced at the time of trial could not be used to bar 
review of federal constitutional issues. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 
it 423-4, citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
457-458, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) ("Novelty in 
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this 
Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior 
decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal 
constitutional rights.11); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 104 S.Ct. 
1830, 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984) (holding that "only a 'firmly 
established and regularly followed state practice' may be interposed 
by a state to prevent subsequent review by this Court of a federal 
constitutional claim"). 
- 19 -
The Court stated: 
To apply [the rule] retroactively to bar 
consideration of a claim . . . would therefore 
apply a new rule unannounced at the time of 
petitioner's trial and consequently inadequate to 
serve as an independent state ground with the 
meaning of James. 
498 U.S. at 424. 
Failure to remove a juror for cause is constitutional erro: 
pursuant to Ross v. Oklahoma, 101 L.Ed.2d at 80; Morgan v. Illinois 
504 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); and 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 
(1985) ; among others. 
In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. , 119 
L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the Court held that a trial court violates due 
process where it refuses to ask jurors whether they would 
automatically impose death. The Court reached that decision based 
on its prior decisions which established that "based on the 
requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for 
cause any prospective juror who maintains [that he or she will 
automatically impose death].11 
In Morgan, the Court relied on its prior decisions which 
established that failure to remove a juror for cause was 
constitutional error. The Court stated: 
[I]t is clear from Witt and Adams, the progeny of 
Witherspoon, that a juror who in no case would 
vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or 
her instructions, is not an impartial juror and 
must be removed for cause. 
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mphasis added)• 
The Morgan Court also pointed out that "in the course of 
caching" its decision in Ross v. Oklahoma, 
We announced our considered view that because the 
Constitution guarantees a defendant on trial for 
his life the right to an impartial jury, 487 
U.S., at 85, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 108 S.Ct. 2273, the 
trial court's failure to remove the juror for 
cause was constitutional error under the standard 
enunciated in Witt. 
19 L.Ed.2d at 502. 
Because due process requires that criminal defendants be 
ble to challenge jurors for cause, it necessarily follows that a 
ue process violation occurs where the trial judge refuses to remove 
tuch jurors for cause. See Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502 (court 
:ommitted error under Wainwright v. Witt). 
In addition, requiring a defendant to use his peremptory 
challenges to remove for cause a juror where no statutory limitation 
on the right to exercise peremptories exists constitutes a further 
due process violation. Pursuant to Rule 18, Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure, Menzies was entitled to exercise ten peremptory 
challenges with additional challenges for alternate jurors. Menzies 
was able to exercise fewer than the rule mandated number of 
peremptory challenges, thereby violating his right to due process. 
Furthermore, the State was able to exercise all of its rule mandated 
peremptory challenges on impartial jurors, creating an imbalance in 
the use of rule mandated peremptory challenges. 
In this case, this Court announced a new rule six years 
after trial which acts as a procedural bar to review of Menzies' 
- 21 -
claim that constitutional error under Witt# Morgan, Ross, and other 
cases occurred in this case. In so doing, this Court violated due 
process and other federal constitutional protections. 
2. The Newly Announced Procedure Is a Clear 
Break With the Past and Therefore Should Not Have 
Been Applied to Menzies. 
The procedure announced in Menzies changes the previous 
procedure for preserving challenges for cause and overrules this 
Court's prior decisions in Crawford v. Manning and its progeny. 
This "abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an 
entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one" is a "clear 
break with the past." United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 
S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 
1123 (Utah 1991). A new rule of criminal procedure which 
constitutes a "clear break with the past" is usually not 
retroactively applied. Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1123. See generally 
Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) (refusing to give 
retroactive application to Wood standard); State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1259-61 (Utah 1988) (applying prospectively the new 
requirement that state can establish unproven criminal conduct by 
proving such conduct in the penalty phase); State v. Jonasf 725 P.2d 
1378, 1380 (Utah 1986) (refusing to give retroactive application to 
new rule regarding cautionary eyewitness identification 
instructions). 
This Court has recognized in civil cases that a change in 
the law will not be applied retroactively when a substantial 
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[justice would result or when there has been justifiable reliance 
i the prior rule. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 
>92); VanDyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1991); Loyal 
rder of Moose No. 259 v. County Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d 
57, 264-5 (Utah 1982). 
In VanDyke, 818 P.2d at 1025, the Court stated: 
However, the modern view is that the retroactive 
operation of a change in common law is not 
invariable and is not a question of judicial 
power; rather, whether a decision will operate 
prospectively should depend solely upon an 
appraisal of the relevant judicial policies to be 
advanced. In making this determination, we look 
to the impact retroactive application would have 
on those affected. When we conclude there had 
been justifiable reliance on the prior state law 
or that the retroactive operation of the new law 
may otherwise create undue burden, the court may 
order that a decision apply only prospectively. 
(emphasis added). 
At trial in the present case, defense counsel followed the 
veil-established rule for preserving challenges for cause. She 
justifiably relied on the existing rule in deciding how to exercise 
her challenges.9 Imposing a new rule on defendant which counsel had 
no way of anticipating creates an undue and unfair burden. Due 
process, equal protection, the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth 
Amendment are violated by this Court's application of a new rule for 
preserving challenges for cause. 
9. In State v. Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1994), slip op. at 
9 fn.2, this Court recognized that until a rule of law is changed, a 
criminal defendant has no reason to advance a new and different 
argument. Defense counsel reasonably followed existing procedure 
for preserving challenges for cause. 
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D. MENZIES DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED 
BY THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ERROR IN DENYING HIS 
CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
In Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26, this Court stated: 
Menzies has not asserted that he faced a partial 
or biased jury during the guilt phase of his 
trial or that the jury was more likely to convict 
as a result of "death qualifying" the jury. 
This determination that Menzies has not shown prejudice is incorrect 
for three reasons: (1) biased jurors sat on the jury, including two 
jurors who had been unsuccessfully challenged for cause; (2) Menzies 
made a record regarding his dissatisfaction with the jury that was 
seated after he was forced to use his peremptory challenges on 
jurors who should have been removed for cause; and (3) Menzies did 
argue that death qualification made a jury more guilt prone, and 
asked this Court to remand the case in light of this Court's 
decision in State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 386-95, 414-17, 418, so that 
he could provide the court with additional evidence in support of 
his argument. Appellant's opening brief at 195-67; reply brief at 
71. 
1. A Biased Jury Sat. 
Menzies challenged Juror Kathy Rosenkrantz for cause based 
on her answers indicating "she would consider voting for the death 
penalty in order to ensure no release from prison ever occurred." 
R. 872; see Juror Rosenkrantz voir dire at T. 860-73 contained in 
Appendix C. R. 871-2. The trial judge denied the challenge, and 
Juror Rosenkrantz sat on the jury. R. 872-3. Defense counsel 
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irified that she was not waiving the challenge against Rosenkrantz 
*n though she had not used a peremptory challenge on Rosenkrantz. 
3 pointed out that "given the entire pool that we had before us, 
was our decision that perhaps there are others that we should 
ke off given their order and the entire situation." R. 891-2; see 
anscript in Appendix D. 
Menzies also challenged Sandra Stroud, who ultimately sat 
the jury, for cause. T. 269-70. The basis of the challenge was 
e juror's long and close associations with police officers. 
269-70; see Appendix E. The officers with whom she had a close 
lationship included her father-in-law, her best friend, a 
eutenant in the Murray City Police, and a brother-in-law. 
482-4. 
2. Jurors Against Whom Menzies Would Have Used 
Additional Peremptory Challenges Sat. 
Menzies indicated on the record that he exercised his 
eremptories as he did based on the pool of jurors available, and 
hat he did not waive his for cause challenges to jurors who sat. 
efense counsel's statement as a whole indicates that Menzies would 
ave used additional peremptories had they been available and 
ixpressed dissatisfaction with the jury which was seated. T. 891-2; 
>ee transcript in Appendix D. 
Menzies would have used additional peremptory challenges on 
rurors Stroud and Rosenkrantz, the jurors whom Menzies had 
msuccessfully challenged for cause. In addition, a peremptory 
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would have been used on Lillian Eaton, the juror who fainted during 
the medical examiner's testimony among others (R. 1621-2). Juror 
Eaton had heard about the case and repeatedly stated that death was 
the appropriate penalty for premeditated murder. T. 843-7. 
This dissatisfaction with the jury which was seated is 
further emphasized by the fact that Menzies waived his right to a 
jury for sentencing after the jury convicted him of capital 
homicide. Had Menzies intended to have the trial judge decide his 
sentence, death qualification of the jury, which Menzies challenged 
(R. 274-95), would have been unnecessary. The timing of the waiver 
coupled with Menzies' expressed dissatisfaction with the jury 
establishes the prejudice caused by the trial judge's erroneous 
denials of challenges for cause. 
3. Menzies Argued in the Trial Court and on 
Appeal That Death Qualification Creates a Guilt 
Prone Jury. 
Menzies filed a pretrial motion to preclude death 
qualification and supporting memorandum. R. 274-5, 276-95. On 
appeal, he renewed his argument, pointing out that death 
qualification results in conviction prone juries (Appellant's 
opening brief at 195-6). Menzies cited various cases in support of 
this proposition, included his trial motion and memorandum (see 
Addendum 0 to Appellant's opening brief), and referred this Court to 
the briefs in the David Young case for further discussion. 
In his reply brief, filed after this Court issued its 
decision in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, Menzies renewed his claim 
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d asked this Court to remand the case for a hearing in which 
rther evidence regarding the procedure and its impact on a 
fendant's right to a fair trial would be introduced. Appellants 
ply Brief at 71. 
Hencef Menzies did claim that the death qualification 
rocess resulted in a more conviction prone jury. This Court 
acorrectly resolved Menzies' challenge for cause claims by relying 
n part on Menzies' failure to argue that death qualification 
reates a more guilt prone jury. This Court incorrectly stated: 
Menzies has not asserted that he faced a partial 
or biased jury during the guilt phase of his 
trial or that the jury was made more likely to 
convict as a result of "death qualifying" the 
Oury. 
lenzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. 
Menzies was prejudiced in this case where biased jurors 
sat, he made a record of his dissatisfaction with the jury that was 
seated, and he argued that death qualification created a guilt prone 
jury. Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court reconsider 
its determination that he was not prejudiced by the trial judge's 
erroneous denials of his challenges for cause. 
POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS 
RESOLUTION OF APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE 
ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The trial judge erroneously instructed the jury regarding 
the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 857. 
Instruction No. 12, a copy of which is contained in Appendix F, 
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contains language which fails to properly define proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. For example, the instruction informed the jury 
that "[pjroof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it." The language was 
disapproved as misstating the law by a majority of this Court in 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1148 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). The instruction also contains the "abiding conviction" 
and "weighty affairs" language disapproved in Johnson and State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Instruction No. 12 as a whole fails to adequately define proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and resembles the unconstitutional "moral 
certainty" and "grave uncertainty" language in the unconstitutional 
Louisiana instruction. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 
S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). The problems with this 
instruction are greater than those in Victor v. Nebraska, 
S.Ct. (1994) (1994 WL 87447), and fail to define reasonable 
doubt. 
In his dissent in the present case, Justice Stewart 
recognized that the reasonable doubt instruction was erroneous. The 
majority of this Court determined that its decisions in Ireland and 
Johnson were "made in exercise of this Court's supervisory powers 
over lower courts" and therefore were not retroactive and did not 
apply to the present case. Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reconsider its decision regarding the erroneous 
reasonable doubt instruction in light of the United States Supreme 
- 28 -
urt decision in Cage and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. , 113 
Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). 
In Cage, the Court held that due process is violated where 
e concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not adequately 
ifined for the jury. Pursuant to Cage# erroneous reasonable doubt 
istructions result in a constitutional violation. Regardless of 
lether this Court used its supervisory powers in Johnson and 
reland, the failure to properly guide the jury in this case amounts 
D a due process and Sixth Amendment violation. 
The failure to adequately instruct the jury on reasonable 
oubt violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial 
ury as well as due process. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. , 
13 S.Ct. , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Justice Scalia, writing for 
unanimous Court, pointed out that the right to an impartial jury 
ncludes "as its most important element," the right to have a jury 
letermine guilt, and that this right is interrelated with the due 
process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, "the 
jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Sullivan, 124 L.Ed.2d at 188. 
In reaching its decision in Sullivan that the failure to 
properly instruct the jury on proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
never harmless error, the Court reasoned that in the absence of a 
proper reasonable doubt instruction, "there has been no jury verdict 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." 124 L.Ed.2d at 189 
(emphasis added). Even if an appellate court were to conclude "that 
a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 
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doubt," such a conclusion does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment 
requirement that a jury make that determination. Id. at 190. The 
Sixth Amendment "requires an actual jury finding of guilty." Id. 
In the present case, the failure to properly instruct the 
jury on proof beyond a reasonable doubt denied Mr. Menzies his 
"right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Rather than focusing on rules for retroactive application of new 
rules of law, this Court should focus on the denial of this H/basic 
protectio[n]' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without 
which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function." Id. at 
191. Because "there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment" in this case, the conviction and death sentence 
cannot stand. 
POINT III. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE 
ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF MENZIES' ENTIRE PRISON 
FILE IN LIGHT OF THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE 
CONTENTS. 
Although the majority did not address the bulk of the 
issues raised regarding the admission of Mr. Menzies' entire prison 
file, Justice Stewart "submit[ted] that it was error for the trial 
court to admit defendant's prison record in bulk." Menzies, 235 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. Mr. Menzies requests that this Court 
reconsider its resolution of this issue. 
Due process requires that evidence submitted in 
the penalty phase of a capital homicide case have 
some degree of relevance and reliability. 
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980). 
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In 
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ate v. Mills Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071, this Court held that due 
ocess in sentencing was violated where an unreliable report 
>ntaining double and triple hearsay was introduced during 
mtencing; see also United States v, Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3rd 
Lr. 1993); United States v, Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971). 
i addition, the Eighth Amendment requires reliability in 
entencing. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989). 
The prison file contains many unreliable reports which 
ontain double and triple hearsay. See Appellant's reply brief at 
6-8. The overwhelming unreliability of these materials and the 
potential for introduction of prison files in future cases 
lemonstrates the importance of this Court directly addressing this 
.ssue. 
POINT IV. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE AND 
OTHER UNADJUDICATED BAD ACTS IS NOT HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
In its opinion, this Court determined that the trial 
judge's failure to make written findings pursuant to State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other 
grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1992), was 
harmless error. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. This Court 
reasoned that l![t]he prior bad acts referred to are quite minor when 
compared to the other evidence of aggravating circumstances." 
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. 
During the penalty phase of this case, the State introduced 
evidence regarding a significant number of unadjudicated bad acts. 
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The trial judge did not make the required Lafferty findings and the 
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Menzies 
committed these acts. This unadjudicated conduct which was not 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt includes inter alia; 
1. Exhibit 1-D double and triple hearsay 
regarding knife incidents, including an 
incident where Menzies allegedly threatened 
a girl with a knife; 
2. Prison file double hearsay report that 
Menzies stabbed another inmate. E8:222-5; 
3. Prison file hearsay allegations of threats 
to inmates and others. E8:205-84, T. 3260; 
4. Prison file hearsay allegation that Menzies 
raped another inmate. E8:180. 
The State failed to prove these incidents beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The number and type of incidents coupled with the 
trial judge's explicit statement that he considered much of the 
unproven other crimes evidence demonstrates that the erroneous 
introduction of this evidence was not harmless. See T. 3248-75. In 
addition, the judge's apparent misunderstanding that a preponderance 
of the evidence standard controlled (T. 3138) further demonstrates 
the unfair prejudice of this evidence. 
The State introduced other evidence of unadjudicated 
conduct by live testimony, e.g., the alleged screwdriver incident at 
the state hospital (T. 2809-27) ; testimony of Jay Labrum regarding 
alleged automobile thefts, drug dealing, and drug use (T. 2762-5). 
The trial judge failed to make Lafferty findings regarding these 
alleged incidents. Hence, this Court is unable to "adequately 
assess whether imposition of a death sentence has been improperly 
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sed on evidence of other crimes which have not been proven beyond 
reasonable doubt." Laffertyf 749 P.2d at 1259 fn.16. 
This Court recognized in Laffertyf 749 P.2d at 1259, that: 
Allowing the sentencer to be influenced by 
material relating to crimes which have not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt would appear to 
violate the Supreme Court's ruling in Gregg that 
evidence admitted during the sentencing must not 
unfairly prejudice the accused. 
The uncontrolled admission of unadjudicated prior acts, the 
ilure to prove such acts beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial 
Ldge's failure to make written findings resulted in an unfair and 
•ejudicial penalty hearing in violation of the Eighth and 
mrteenth Amendments. Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this 
>urt reconsider its resolution of this issue. 
POINT V. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS 
RESOLUTION OF MENZIES# CLAIM THAT APPLICATION OF 
THE HEINOUSNESS AGGRAVATOR REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY 
PHASE. 
The trial judge stated: 
I will go over the aggravating circumstances 
first, and then the mitigating circumstances, and 
interspersed in the aggravating circumstances may 
be mitigating circumstances . . . . 
. 3249. The judge then stated, •»[i]n starting with the aggravating 
ircumstances, I will start with the nature of the crime." 
. 3249. The judge then listed by number five aggravating 
ircumstances relating to the nature of the crime. The fifth 
ircumstance was the erroneous heinousness aggravator. T. 3250. 
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Five, 76-2-210(Q), "the homicide"—or that 
might be (G). No, that might be (Q), "the 
homicide was committed in an especially heinous, 
atrocious, cruel manner demonstrated by serious 
bodily injury to the victim before death. 
T. 3250. 
This explicit reliance, including the effort to clarify th€ 
appropriate subsection,11 demonstrates that the judge relied on this 
improper subsection. Assuming that the judge was aware of this 
Court's "previous decisions limiting capital murders deemed ruthless 
and brutal to those 'involving an aggravated battery or torture'" 
does not undo the explicit reliance evidenced in the record in this 
case. Furthermore, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is replete with 
examples of situations where trial judges have not read or followed 
cases limiting the application of the heinousness aggravator. In 
addition, this case is filled with examples of circumstances where 
the trial judge did not follow case law from this Court. For 
example, this Court recognized that "the trial judge did not make 
written findings that the prior bad acts evidenced by material found 
10. The reference to 76-2-2 is apparently a transcription error. 
See State v. Menziesy 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992). 
11. In the Menzies opinion, the Court stated, "[t]he prosecutor, 
however, did not refer the court to the 'heinous' provision in 
section 76-5-202(1)(q)." Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. The 
prosecutor argued in both opening and rebuttal that the heinousness 
aggravator applied. T. 3209, 3236-7. Not specifically delineating 
the heinousness code section does not change the fact that the 
prosecutor argued that the heinousness aggravator applied. The 
trial judge apparently looked up the code section and made an extra 
effort to be sure that he cited the correct subsection when 
discussing the heinousness aggravator. This extra effort by the 
trial judge demonstrates further that he did, in fact, rely on the 
heinousness aggravator in assessing sentence. 
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in his prison file had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
required by our decision in State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1988)." Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. The record in this case 
establishes that counsel provided the trial judge with the Lafferty 
opinion; nevertheless, the trial judge failed to make the explicitly 
required findings. The assumption that the trial judge was familiar 
with Wood and followed its directives should not be made given that 
the trial judge did not follow directives in cases which were 
provided to him. 
Where a sentencer improperly relies on an invalid 
aggravating factor, the reviewing court must, at the very least, 
reweigh the remaining aggravating factors and mitigating 
circumstances or conduct a harmless error review. As outlined in 
Petitioner's reply brief at 54-6, the significant weight given the 
heinousness aggravator in death penalty determinations and under the 
circumstances of this case requires a new penalty hearing. The 
ability of the judge to consider the nature and circumstances of the 
crime does not relieve the reviewing court from the requirement that 
it reweigh the factors or conduct a harmless error review. 
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court rehear this issue. 
POINT VI. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS 
REFUSAL TO ADDRESS MENZIES' CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL 
JUDGE IMPROPERLY RELIED ON THE PECUNIARY GAIN 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. 
Mr. Menzies argued that the trial judge violated due 
rocess and the Eighth Amendment by explicitly relying on the 
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in addition to the robbery 
circumstance based on the same evidence. Appellant's opening brief 
at 165-7; reply brief at 56-58. This Court did not address this 
issue in the opinion. 
In Parsons v. Barnesf 230 Utah Adv Rep. 3, 10-11 (Utah 
1994), this Court held that a capital defendant could not be charged 
with both the pecuniary gain and robbery aggravating circumstances 
based on the same conduct. This Court reasoned that "under the 
present scheme, defendants who commit a homicide in the course of a 
robbery will always begin the sentencing hearing with two 
aggravating factors against them for no other reason than that the 
underlying felony was a robbery. [citations omitted]." Parsons, 
230 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. This Court recognized the inherent 
unfairness of such a scheme and that this "double-counting" fails to 
"narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty," as 
required by the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
Pursuant to Parsons and the cases cited by Menzies in his 
opening and reply briefs, the trial judge committed Eighth Amendment 
error when he relied on the pecuniary gain aggravating 
circumstance. Espinoza v. Florida, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2926, 
120 L.Ed.2d 954 (1992), citing Sochor v. Florida, 540 U.S. , 112 
S.Ct. 2114, 2119, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992). "Employing an invalid 
aggravating factor in the weighing process 'creates the 
possibility . . . of randomness." Sochor, 19 L.Ed.2d at 336, 
erupting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. , , 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 
L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). 
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When the sentencer relied on an invalid aggravating factor, 
the reviewing court may not merely affirm the sentence because such 
an approach "deprives a defendant of 'the individualized treatment 
that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating 
factors and aggravating circumstances.'" Sochor, 119 L.Ed.2d at 
337, citing demons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752, 110 S.Ct. 
1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990). Instead, the reviewing court must 
either "reweigh without the invalid aggravating factor or determine 
that weighing the invalid factor was harmless error."12 Id. 
Petitioner respectfully requests that in this case, where 
the trial judge relied on the invalid pecuniary gain aggravating 
circumstances, this Court reconsider its decision. 
POINT VII. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS 
RESOLUTION OF MENZIES' CLAIM THAT THE ADMISSION 
OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY 
HEARING. 
Menzies argued that the admission of victim impact evidence 
during the penalty phase violated the Eighth Amendment and Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207(2) in addition to Article I, Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution. Appellant's opening brief at 184-8. In State v. 
garter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 at 32-33, this Court held "that victim 
mpact evidence is inadmissible under subsection 76-3-207(2) of the 
tah Code. This Court stated: 
2. As Menzies argued in his reply brief, reliance on this 
Iditional improper aggravating circumstance may well have been the 
:humb on the scale" which tipped the balance towards a death 
mtence. In addition, improper reliance on this factor and the 
dnousness factor had the cumulative effect of prejudicing Menzies. 
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Permitting the State to introduce victim impact 
evidence shifts the focus of the proceeding from 
the defendant to the victim and the effect of the 
murder on the victim's family and community. 
This shift adds nothing to the culpability 
analysis and is fraught with danger. [citation 
omitted] 
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33. 
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider his argument that the admission of victim impact evidence 
requires a new trial in light of the Utah statutory limitations on 
such evidence. 
POINT VIII. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS MENZIES' 
CLAIM THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY 
BECAUSE OTHERWISE MR. MENZIES MIGHT BE PAROLED 
AND/OR ESCAPE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY HEARING. 
This Court did not address Menzies' claims that the 
prosecutor's arguments that Menzies might be paroled and/or escape 
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution and required a new penalty 
hearing. See Appellant's brief at 176-8, 179-81; reply brief at 
65-7. After the prosecutor made such arguments, the trial judge 
explicitly relied on the possibility of parole or escape as factors 
supporting the imposition of the death penalty. T. 3211, 3254. 
Appellant maintains that (1) the evidence did not support 
an argument that someone in Appellant's position would ever be 
paroled or that anyone housed in the current Uintah II maximum 
security facility had ever escaped, and (2) such argument is 
improper, based on speculation and violates the state and federal 
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constitutions. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 421 fn.4 
(Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (argument by prosecution 
that the death penalty should be imposed because the defendant might 
be paroled and kill again " . . . is disingenuous, unprofessional and 
improper . . ."; Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165, 1185 (Ala. Cr. 
App. 1990) (improper for prosecutor to argue possibility of parole); 
People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d 119, 134 (111. 1984),- Collier v. State, 
705 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Nev. 1985). 
The emotional impact of such an argument on the sentencer 
coupled with the frequency with which such arguments are made by 
prosecutors in capital cases in Utah demonstrates the need for this 
Court to directly address this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court either 
reverse his conviction and/or death sentence or rehear the issues 
set forth herein. 
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\yseT's cteims Nos. 51-602-5 and 51-602-1. 
These contentions were not ruled on by the trial 
court and consequently are not before us for 
review in the proceeding. If plaintiffs have 
properly raised these issues in their section -24 
petition and/or their objections to the addendum, 
they are before the trial court, and a 
determination will be made when further 
proceedings are had upon remand. 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Leonard H. Russon, Court of Appeals Judge 
Hall, Justice, does not participate herein; 
Russon; Judge, sat prior to his appointment to 
this court. 
1. The current statutory provisions for the general 
adjudication of water rights are at Utah Code Ann-
§§73-4-1 through -24. 
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Ralph LeRoy Menzies appeals his 1988 jury 
conviction for capital murder and the trial 
court's subsequent imposition of the dea& 
penalty. Menzies raises numerous claims of 
error in the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, 
including (i) failure to remove five jurors for 
cause; (\\) failure to grant a mistrial following 
"surprise" testimony; (iii) admission of 
preliminary hearing testimony of a jailhouse 
informant; fiv) consideration of a heinousness 
afcgravauag circumstance duriag the pea&ity 
phase; (v) admission of victim impact evidence 
during the penalty phase; and (vi) use of the 
incorrect standard in sentencing Menzies to 
death. We affirm the conviction and sentence. 
As background, we recite those facts that are 
largely undisputed. At approximately 9:50 p.m. 
on Sunday, February 23, 1986, Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's deputies were dispatched to the 
Gas-A-Mat station located at 3995 West 4700 
South. The deputies found customers waiting to 
pay, but the cashier's booth empty and the door 
locked. The station attendant, Maurine 
Hunsaker, was missing, although her coat was 
still in the booth and a radio was playing. A 
preliminary accounting indicated that 
approximately $70 in cash was missing from the 
register.! 
At approximately 11:05 that same night, 
Maurine telephoned her husband, Jim, at their 
home. Deputy Scott Gamble was with Jim at the 
time. Maurine told her husband that she had 
been robbed and kidnapped, but that her 
abductor(s) intended to release her sometime that 
night. Deputy Gamble also spoke with Maurine, 
and she again indicated that a robbery had 
occurred. However, Deputy Gamble was unable 
to get a clear answer regarding the kidnapping. 
Maurine also refused, or was unable, to answer 
Gamble's question regarding her location. When 
Jim again spoke with his wife, she asked him 
what she should do. The line then went dead. 
At approximately 5 p.m. on Tuesday, 
February 25, 1986, a hiker discovered Maurine 
Hunsaker's body at the Storm Mountain picnic 
area in Big Cottonwood Canyon. She had been 
strangled and her throat cut. Her purse, which 
had not been found at the gas station, was not 
with the body or in the immediate area. That 
same evening, a jailer at the Salt Lake County 
Jail found several identification cards belonging 
to Maurine Hunsaker in a desk drawer in one of 
the jail's changing rooms. He recognized the 
picture on the driver's license as a woman 
reported missing the night before on television 
news. 
Detectives later determined how the cards got 
into the drawer. Menzies had been booked into 
the jail on unrelated charges at approximately 
6:40 jp.m. on Monday, February 24, 1986. He 
leftlhe booking area for a short time without 
supervision and was found in a changing room. 
Shortly thereafter, Maurine Hunsaker's 
identification cards were found in a clothing 
hamper in that room. Unaware of the 
kidnapping, the officer who found the cards 
placed them in the desk drawer where the jailer 
found them Tuesday night. 
Also on Tuesday evening, a high school 
student named Tim Larrabee was watching the 
news and learned that a hiker had discovered a 
woman's body at Storm Mountain. On 
Wednesday, Larrabee notified deputies that he 
and his girlfriend, Beth Brown, had skipped 
school on Monday, February 24th, and were at 
Storm Mountam. Larrabee had 
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full-sized, two-door, late-1960s model, 
cream-colored automobile in the parking lot. He 
said that the vehicle was similar in appearance to 
a 1968 Buick Riviera. Larrabee and Brown also 
saw a man and woman at the site but saw 
nothing unusual happening between the two. 
They later heard a short scream, but Larrabee 
thought that the woman had slipped or had been 
frightened by an animal. Approximately fifteen 
minutes later, Larrabee saw the man walking 
alone. Neither Larrabee nor Brown saw the 
woman again. 
Larrabee described the suspect as a white 
male, 25-30 years of age, 6 T tall, with a 
medium build (approximately 170 pounds), 
.black, curly hair, prominent sideburns and a 
mustache, and wearing wire-rimmed glasses. A 
detective created a composite drawing of a 
possible suspect based on this description. After 
learning that Maurine's identification cards had 
been found at the jail, sheriffs detectives 
compared the composite drawing with the 
photographs of more than two hundred inmates 
who had been booked into the facility from 
February 23 rd through the 25th. Three 
photographs were chosen as possible matches, 
.including that of defendant Menzies. 
Detective Jerry Thompson questioned Menzies 
regarding the Hunsaker homicide. Menzies said 
that on Sunday, February 23rd, he borrowed a 
car from Troy Denter and picked up a young 
woman on State Street that evening. He told the 
detective that while with this woman, he picked 
up his girlfriend, Nicole Arnold, and drove 
around until the two women began to argue. 
Menzies reportedly dropped off Nicole and then 
left the unidentified woman somewhere around 
7200 West and 2400 South. According to 
Menzies, he then went home, where he talked 
with Nicole. 
On February 28th, detectives questioned 
Denter. He told them he loaned his 
cream-colored 1974 Chevrolet to Menzies on 
Sunday, February 23rd, sometime in the 
afternoon. He said that Menzies did not return 
the car until the afternoon of Monday, February 
24th. Detectives then took Larrabee and Brown 
to the jail parking lot, where they identified 
Deuter's car as the one they saw at Str rm 
Mountain. They were also shown a photospread 
consisting of six photographs. Larrabee indicated 
that Menzies appeared to be the man he saw at 
Storm Mountain. Several months later, however, 
Larrabee did not correctly identify Menzies in a 
lineup. 
Detectives found Maurine Hunsaker's 
fingerprint in Denter's car and located her purse 
in Menzies* apartment. Menzies was charged 
with first degree murder, a capital offense. See 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202.2 After the charges 
were filed, Walter Button, Menzies* ceil mate, 
contacted detectives about the homicide. Britton 
said that on February 27th, Menzies told him 
that he killed Hunsaker to prevent her from 
testifying against him. 
UTAH 
Following a month-long trial, a jury convicted 
Menzies of capital homicide and aggravated 
kidnapping. After Menzies waived the jury in 
the penalty phase, the trial judge sentenced him 
to death. Menzies then moved for a new trial, 
arguing that errors in recording and transcribing 
made the record inadequate for purposes of 
appellate review. The trial court denied the 
motion, and this court affirmed, ordering 
Menzies to proceed with the appeal on the 
merits. Suite v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 
1992). We now address Menzies' contentions. 
Menzies' first issue on appeal deals with the 
jury selection process. He claims that the trial 
I court should have removed four jurors for cause 
because of their attitudes regarding the death 
penalty and a fifth because that juror was unable 
to be impartial during the guilt phase of the 
trial. Menzies removed all five by peremptory 
challenge. He now asserts that the trial court 
committed reversible error by forcing defense 
counsel to use a peremptory strike to remove 
potential jurors when the trial court should have 
removed those jurors for cause. Menzies makes 
no attempt to demonstrate that the forced use of 
any of these peremptory challenges was harmful. 
Instead, he relies on the automatic reversal rule 
of Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 
1975), and its progeny. Under these cases, 
reversal is required whenever a party is 
compelled "to exercise a peremptory challenge 
to remove a panel member who should have 
been stricken for cause." State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988); see also Crawford, 
542 P.2d at 1093. 
The State, on the other hand, asks us to 
overturn the Crawford line of cases and follow 
the approach utilized by a majority of the states 
and upheld by the federal courts. Those 
following the majority approach "reject the 
notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge 
constitutes a violation of the constitutional right 
to an impartial jury." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 81, 88 (1988). "So long as the jury that 
sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had 
to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that 
result does not mean the [Constitution] was 
violated." Id. (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 
430, 436 (1887)). To prevail on a claim ot error 
based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, 
a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., 
show that a member of the jury was partial or 
incompetent. See id. at 89. We agree with the 
State and overrule Crawford and its progeny. 
We note at the outset that Crawford's per se 
rule is a relatively recent development in Utah 
law. Utah case law dating back to territorial 
times did not presume prejudice when a trial 
court erroneously failed to remove a prospective 
juror for cause and forced a party to use a 
peremptory challenge. For example, in People 
v. Hopt, 9 P. 407 (Utah 1886), ajfd, 120 U.S. 
430, 442 (1887), an early death penalty case, 
the defendant complained that he was prejudiced 
because the court had failed to excuse three 
jurors for cause. The defendant did not exhaust 
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of his peremptory challenges, and one of the 
ee challenged jurors sat on the jury. On 
>eal, this court held: 
Al perfect answer to the point raised is that 
>f the three jurors challenged two were not 
worn. One was challenged peremptorily by 
be defendant, and one by the people. 
Whether, therefore, the challenges were 
>roperly denied or not, they did not sit as 
urors; the defendant was not prejudiced by 
he ruling. 
at 408; see also Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. 
R., 186 P.2d 293, 298-99 (Utah 1947); State 
Zano, 228 P. 563, 568 (Utah 1924); State v. 
>rne, 126 P. 286, 291 (Utah 1912). As for 
challenged juror who actually sat, this court 
ognized that the defendant still had 
emptory challenges remaining and held that 
il the defendant exhausted his peremptory 
dlenges he could not complain about the 
nposition of the jury. Hopt, 9 P. at 408; see 
o State v. Wetzel, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 
5c. 30, 1993); State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. 
p. 12, 13 (Dec. 30, 1993). 
loot remained the ruk in Utah until our 1975 
iwford decision. In Crawford, a civil case, 
plaintiffs exercised one of their three allotted 
emptory challenges to remove a panelist 
am the trial court should have removed for 
se. Although six of eight jurors would have 
n sufficient to return a verdict and the jury 
nimously found against the plaintiffs, this 
rt refused to conclude that the error was 
mless. Crawford, 542 P.2d at 1093. In 
srsing the jury verdict, Justice Ellett asserted, 
exercising one of their peremptory 
Uengesupon this prospective juror, plaintiffs 
only two remaining. The juror which 
ained because the plaintiffs had no challenge 
emove him may have been a hawk amid 
m doves and imposed his will upon them." 
Interestingly, Justice Ellett made this 
rtion even though the plaintiffs did not 
plain that any of the jurors who sat were 
sd or prejudiced against them, 
lose asking us to overturn prior precedent 
> a substantia] burden of persuasion. See 
> v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 
>). This burden is mandated by the doctrine 
are decisis. In State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
> (Utah 1993), we discussed stare decisis in 
context of multiple panels of the court of 
als and emphasized the importance of its 
rvance: 
is doctrine, under which the first decision 
a court on a particular question of law 
/eras later decisions by the same court, is 
cornerstone of the Anglo-American 
isprudence that is crucial to the 
dictability of the law and the fairness of 
udication. 
:1269. 
Thurman, we made it clear that the doctrine 
is as between different panels of the court 
)peals. Id.3 Certainly the doctrine also 
ss to a court of last resort, such as a state 
supreme court. Nevertheless, we wish to make 
clear that the doctrine is neither mechanical nor 
rigid as it relates to courts of last resort. See 
Stoker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423-24 
(Utah 1990); American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 
701 P.2d 1069, 1071-75 (Utah 1985). 
The general American doctrine as applied to 
courts of last resort is that a court is not 
inexorably bound by its own precedents but 
will follow the rule of law which it has 
established in earlier cases, unless clearly 
convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than 
harm will come by departing from 
precedent. 
John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial 
Decision, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 367 (1957); see 
also Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 333 U.S. 
445, 471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) ("When 
precedent and precedent alone is all the 
argument that can be made to support a 
court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's 
creator to destroy it."). Although we do not do 
so lightly, we believe that now is the proper 
time to overrule Crawford. Because we are 
departing from a prior precedent that has been 
followed for approximately twenty years, it is 
incumbent on us to explain why we overrule it. 
Cf. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 427. 
We note that Crawford is not the most weighty 
of precedents. First, in establishing Crawford's 
per se rule, Justice Ellett not only failed to 
explain why he was abandoning the 
long-established Hopt rule, see Monell v. 
Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 
U.S. 658, 695 (1978), but failed to cite that line 
of cases altogether. Because the briefs in 
Crawford addressed the issue only tangentiaily 
and never cited the Hopt line of cases, it seems 
likely that Justice Ellett and the rest of the court 
did not even realize that they were departing 
from well-established Utah precedent. See 20 
Am. Jur. 2d Courts §193 (1965) ("[S]tare 
decisis effect of case is substantially diminished 
by the fact that the legal point therein was 
decided without argument."). 
Second, Justice Ellett established the per se 
rule wiih little analysis and without reference to 
authority. In other situations where we have 
established presumptions of harm, we have 
carefully discussed the reasons for taking such 
an unusual step. See, e.g., State v. Crowley, 766 
P.2d 1069,1071-72 (Utah 1988) (closure of trial 
to friends and relatives of accused); State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920-22 (Utah 1987) 
(prosecutor's failure to disclose materials sought 
by defense); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 
752-54 (Utah 1986) (gruesome photographs). 
Third, in addition to Crawford%s lack of 
acknowledgement prior authority and its weak 
analytical underpinnings, this court has 
concluded that its per se rule does not work very 
well. See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §187 (1965). 
This conclusion is evidenced by our straining to 
find that no error has occurred, thus avoiding 
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Crawford's mechanical reversal requirement. 
See, e.g., State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19 (March 2, 1994) (finding no abuse of 
discretion but "strongly advis[ing] trial courts to 
be more conservative in the future when making 
for-cause determinations in capital cases"); 
Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 (holding "trial 
judge was at the very limit of his discretion" in 
refusing to remove prospective juror for cause); 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451-55 (finding trial court 
did not abuse discretion in refusing to remove 
prospective jurors for cause). We think that 
candor in the law would be better served by 
abandoning Crawford rather than straining 
against its requirement by upholding trial courts' 
questionable for-cause determinations. 
We conclude that even if the trial court erred 
in failing to remove those prospective jurors 
whom Menzies found objectionable, that error 
was harmless. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
Menzies has not asserted that he faced a partial 
or biased jury during the guilt phase of his trial 
or that the jury was made more likely to convict 
as a result of "death qualifying" the jury. Cf. 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 342, 386-95, 
414-17 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, while the 
bulk of Menzies* objections to potential jurors 
revolved around those individuals' views on the 
death penalty, the penalty phase was tried to the 
court rather than to the jury. 
Menzies next claims that the trial court erred 
in denying his motion for a mistrial following 
"surprise" testimony by Tim Laxxabee, the high 
school student who saw a man and a woman at 
the Storm Mountain picnic area the day of the 
homicide. This claim of surprise arose from a 
lineup conducted by the sheriffs office in which 
Larrabee identified someone other than Menzies 
as the individual he saw at Storm Mountain. At 
trial, the prosecutor did not ask Larrabee about 
the lineup during his case-in-chief. On 
cross-examination, however, Larrabee's 
"misidentification" was brought out by the 
defense. On redirect, the prosecutor asked 
Larrabee about a conversation the two of them 
had while walking back to the prosecutor's 
office after the lineup. Larrabee testified that 
during the walk, he asked the prosecutor 
whether "number 6* was the correct person. 
Number six was Menzies. 
Because the prosecution had never informed 
defense counsel about the post-lineup 
conversation, defense counsel moved to strike 
the testimony ".concerning [Larrabee's] 
equivocation of the lineup selection" and 
requested that the court admonish the jury not to 
consider that testimony. The trial court granted 
the motion, struck the testimony, and instructed 
the jury to disregard it. Later that day, the 
defense moved for a mistrial, but the motion 
was denied. Menzies new claims that the trial 
judge erred in denying the motion for mistrial. 
Menzies' argument is twofold. First, he claims 
that the State violated rule 16 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure in failing to disclose 
Larrabee *s post-lineup statement. Second. 
Menzies claims that this failure to disclose the 
conversation violated his right to due process 
under the federal constitution because the 
post-lineup statement was critical to the 
prosecution's case. Because of our disposition of 
the rule 16 question, we need not indulge in a 
separate due-process analysis. 
Under our decision in Knight, when a 
prosecutor undertakes to respond voluntarily to 
discovery requests from the defense, the 
prosecutor either must produce "all of the 
material requested or must explicitly identify 
those portions of the request with respect to 
which no responsive material will be provided." 
734 P.2d at 916-17. This obligation is ongoing 
and is justified as a guard against misleading the 
defense by an incomplete prosecutorial response 
to discovery. If a violation of this duty is found, 
the trial court may fashion a remedy under rule 
16(g)/ 
A complaint that the trial court failed to order 
a requested remedy or that the remedy ordered 
was insufficient to obviate the harm resulting 
from the violation is reviewed under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard, id. at 9iS-19. The 
trial court's discretion in fashioning a remedy 
for a violation is not abused unless prejudice 
sufficient to result in a reversal of the conviction 
occurred due to the discovery violation. Id. 
In. the present case, the trial court found that 
the State had failed to disclose requested 
information. For purposes of our analysis today, 
we accept that ruling as correct. Defense counsel 
asked the trial judge to strike the testimony of 
Larrabee regarding the post-lineup discussion 
with the prosecutor. The trial judge granted that 
motion and admonished the jury to disregard the 
testimony. Later in the day, defense counsel 
requested the further remedy of a mistrial. The 
judge denied that request. To conclude that an 
abuse of discretion occurred, we must find that 
unacceptable prejudice to Menzies remained 
after the testimony was stricken. This we cannot 
do. 
We generally presume that a jury will follow 
the instructions given it. State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 
880, 883-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing State 
v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974)), cert, 
der.ica, 853 P.2G 897 (Utah 1993). Here, the 
testimony consisted of a very brief series of 
questions and answers. The court promptly 
ordered the colloquy stricken and admonished 
the jury to ignore it. Considering the ambiguous 
nature of the testimony and the fact that it was 
not vivid or graphic, there is no reason to 
believe that the jury would be uniquely unable to 
follow the court's instructions and ignore the 
testimony. As such, the remedy ordered was 
entirely sufficient to cure the discovery 
violation. 
Even if we were to assume that for some 
reason this testimony were of such a dramatic 
nature that the jury was likely to consider it 
despite the court's instructions, we still find no 
harm. When Larrabee first contacted the 
sheriffs office, he described a suspect within 
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one inch in height and ten pounds in weight of 
Menzies. He accurately described Menzies' hair, 
facial hair, and glasses and helped create a 
composite drawing that was so accurate that 
detectives were able to select Menzies' 
photograph from among those of 200 inmates. 
Larrabee also accurately described and identified 
Denter's car There was other substantial 
evidence linking Menzies to the homicide, 
including the victim's fingerprint m Denter's 
car. In light of all this, the fact that on redirect 
Larrabee mentioned that he had some notion that 
Menzies was the person he should have picked 
m the lineup is hardly pivotal to Menzies' 
conviction. We conclude that it is extraordinarily 
unlikely that any prejudice that might have 
survived the striking of Larrabee's testimony 
had any effect on the jury, and certainly not an 
effect that would nse to the level necessary to 
Tequire reversal. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing the motion for a mistrial. 
Menzies next asserts that the trial court erred 
in allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of 
Walter Bntton to be read to the jury. Bntton, 
who had shared a cell with Menzies at the Salt 
Lake County Jail, testified at the preliminary 
hearing that Menzies told him he killed Maunne 
Hunsaker. At the time of trial, however, Bntton 
refused to testify despite a finding of contempt 
by the court. The court thus ruled that Bntton 
was "unavailable" as defined m rule 804(a)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence,5 making the 
transcnpt of his preliminary hearing testimony 
admissible under that rule. The defense moved 
to suppress the transcnpt, but the motion was 
denied. 
Menzies now argues that the admission of 
Bntton's preliminary hearing testimony violated 
his nght to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment of the Umted States Constitution. 
Specifically, he claims that the trial court erred 
m finding Bntton unavailable because the 
prosecution did not make a good faith effort to 
procure Bntton's testimony. Menzies further 
claims that even if Bntton was actually 
unavailable, the preliminary hearing testimony 
should not have been admitted because the 
defense did not have *he opportunit} to properlv 
develop the testimony it wanted brought out at 
tnal during cross-examination, a prerequisite to 
admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. In 
response, the State asserts that because Bntton 
was physically present at tnal, the Confrontation 
Clause was not implicated. 
Although Bntton's testimony was admissible 
under rule 804, we have recognized that the 
"admission of certain evidence could be justified 
under a hearsay exception [to the rules], yet still 
violate the defendant's constitutional nght of 
confrontation." Slate v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 
1111-12 (Utah 1989) (separate opinion of 
Zimmerman, J.), State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 
778, 785 n.31 (Utah 1980). As a result, we 
must de term me whether admission of Bntton's 
testimony has impmged on the values embodied 
m the Confrontation Clause to such a degree as 
to rise to the level of a constitutional violation 
Webb, 779 P 2d at 1112 (separate opmion of 
Zimmerman, J ). 
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U S 56 (1980), the 
Umted States Supreme Court articulated a 
two-pronged test for determining the 
admissibility of hearsay when a hearsay 
declarant is not present for cross-examination at 
tnal. First, there must be a showing of 
"unavailability." Id. at 66 Second, if the 
declarant is unavailable, the statement at issue is 
"admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of 
reliability." Id.; see State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 
537,539 (Utah 1981) (adoptmg two-pronged test 
established m Roberts). 
Addressmg the first prong of the test, 
constitutional unavailability is found only when 
it is "practically impossible to produce the 
witness m court." Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113 
(separate opmion of Zimmerman, J.); see State 
v White, 671 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1983), State 
v. Chapman, 655 P 2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982), 
State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. 
App ), cert, denied. 765 P 2d 127" (Utah 1987) 
Unavailability will not be found merely because 
"the witness would be uncomfortable on the 
stand or . . . testifying would be stressful." 
Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113 (separate opmion of 
Zimmerman, J.). In short, every reasonable 
effort must be made to produce the witness. Id 
(separate opmion of Zimmerman, J.). Here, the 
record indicates that Bntton was physically 
present at tnal, pursuant to a court order, and 
repeatedly refused to testify despite the judge's 
order to do so. We conclude that every 
reasonable effort was made to produce Bntton at 
tnal, and the tnal court correctly concluded that 
Bntton was unavailable. 
In the second step of our Confrontation Clause 
analysis, we must determine whether Bntton's 
preliminary hearing testimony bore sufficient 
indicia of reliability to warrant its admission at 
tnal. Menzies admits that preliminary hearing 
testimony usually meets the reliability standard, 
Brooks, 638 P.2d at 540, but argues that the 
pnor testimony at issue here was unreliable 
because (I) Bntton was a jailhouse informant 
whose testimoc> was inherently suspect as he 
stood to benefit from the testimony; (n) his 
mental competence was at issue and Menzies 
was not aware of this untri after the preliminary 
hearing; and (ui) defense counsel did not have 
the opportunity to examine Bntton at the 
preliminary hearing regarding his subsequent 
convictions. The State asserts that the testimony 
was reliable because Bntton's testimony was 
given under oath before a judge and Menzies 
was represented by counsel who had the 
opportune to cross-examine Bntton 
We agree with the 6cate. The cntical issue of 
reliability relates to the preliminary hearing 
testimony, not to Bntton's potential testimony at 
tnal. The defense contends that its 
cross-examination of Bntton would have been 
more effective at tnal because of events that 
occurred after the prelimmarv hearing and 
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information that became known alter that time. 
While that assertion may be true, as we have 
recognized previously, "The Confrontation 
Clause guarantees only *an opportunity for 
e f f ec t i ve c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , not 
cross-examination that is effective in whatever 
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might 
wish.'" State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 (Utah) 
(quoting United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 
559 (1988)), cert, denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 145 
(1993). 
Here, the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
shows that the defense had the opportunity for 
an effective cross-examination of Britton. While 
we agree that new evidence obtained after the 
hearing may have aided an attack on Britton's 
credibility on cross-examination, the preliminary 
hearing transcript indicates that the issue was 
well-explored. Defense counsel brought out 
Britton's criminal history, including pending 
charges against him, as well as the fact that 
Britton might receive more favorable treatment 
by the courts because of his cooperation with 
law enforcement officials. Furthermore, the 
defense introduced extrinsic evidence related to 
Britton's credibility at trial and might have 
introduced other credibility-related evidence as 
well. For example, the trial transcript indicates 
that Britton had been incarcerated in a mental 
health section of the county jail before the 
preliminary hearing was held. 
Reviewing the preliminary hearing testimony 
as a whole, we find it contains sufficient indicia 
of reliability to warrant its admission at trial. j 
We therefore conclude that the requirements of 
the Confrontation Clause have been met. 
Although not argued below, Menzies now 
contends that the trial court committed plain 
error by not excluding portions of Britton's 
testimony under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Specifically, Menzies claims that he 
was unfairly prejudiced by Britton's testimony to 
the effect that Menzies had said cutting Maurine 
Hunsaker's throat was "one of the biggest thrills 
that he'd had." In addition, Menzies argues that 
Britton's testimony that Menzies laughed about 
the homicide should also have been excluded. 
We first note that the defense waived the rule 
403 issue ?y failing tc interpose an objection to 
these statements at trial. As a result, Menzies is 
entitled to appellate review only if he can show 
that the trial court committed "plain error." 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989). To find plain 
error, Menzies must establish three elements: (i) 
An error occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; 
and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see Verde, 
770 P.2d at 122. If any one of these elements is 
missing, there can be no finding of plain error. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. 
Here, we dispose of Menzies' challenge under 
the first element. Rule 403 requires that 
proffered evidence be excluded when its 
"probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 
403. Such a weighing should result in exclusion 
when the evidence would have "'an undue 
tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, on an 
emotional one.*" State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 
984 (Utah 1989) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 
advisory committee's note). To find that an 
error has been made in admitting evidence in the 
face of a rule 403 objection, we must conclude 
that the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting the challenged evidence to be 
received. Specifically, we must find that the 
ruling in favor of admissibility was beyond the 
limits of reasonability. State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). 
Our review of the transcript does not lead us 
to the conclusion that the trial court exceeded 
the bounds of its discretion in admitting the two 
challenged statements. While we agree that 
Britton's testimony is inflammatory, we do not 
conclude that it reaches the level of mandatory 
exclusion. Cf. Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984-86 
(analyzing letter written by murderer to victim's 
father); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 476-77 (plurality 
opinion of Hall, CJ.) (discussing gruesome 
photographs); id. at 493 (opinion of 
Zimmerman, J.) (same); Cloud, 722 P.2d at 
752-53 (same); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 
64-65 (Utah 1983) (same). We think that the 
defense has taken the statement regarding 
Menzies' thrill at cutting someone's throat out of 
context and has placed undue emphasis on it 
here: 
A Yes, sir. I asked him why he killed her—I 
asked him why he shot her, because I did 
not know how she was killed. 
Q What did he say? 
A He stated that he didn't shoot her, that he 
cut her throat. 
Q Did you ask him anything else? 
A Not upon that night. It wasn't until the 
next morning, 1 believe, that we talked 
further. 
Q In that initial conversation, did he give 
you any more details regarding the murder? 
A No, sir, not really. Tt wasn't until after 
we had spoken again, which was the next 
morning, that he really went into details on 
it. 
Q Where did that second conversation take 
place the next morning? 
A That second conversation took place in 
the same place, there in the tier. 
Q And how did that conversation come 
about? 
A That conversation came about upon our 
awakening, and he started talking to me. 
And he'd asked me if I had ever cut 
anybody's throat before. 
Q What did you say to that? 
A 1 said yes, sir, I have. 
Q What did he say next? 
A And he said it was one of the biggest 
thrills that he'd had. 
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\ s for the statement about Menzies* laughing 
len he spoke of the homicide, we note that 
is statement was elicited during 
Dss-examination by the defense. Furthermore, 
s statement was made in response to questions 
yarding possible confrontations between 
itton and Menzies at the county jail; there was 
reference to the Hunsaker homicide itself 
ring the exchange. In fact, the homicide itself 
d not been mentioned by defense counsel for 
proximately ten transcript pages before the 
itement. We find no merit to the claim of 
iin error. 
Menzies argues that in the penalty phase of the 
d, the judge improperly considered 
inousness as an aggravating circumstance and, 
: re fore, he is entitled to a new penalty phase, 
cause the objection was not raised at trial, we 
ain must consider whether there was plain 
-or. 
rhe Utah Code provides that the death penalty 
iv be sought when 
t)he homicide was committed in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
exceptionally depraved manner, any of 
vhich must be demonstrated by physical 
orture, serious physical abuse, or serious 
>odily injury of the victim before death, 
ah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(q). In State v. 
ttley 780 P.2d 1203, 1217 (Utah 1989), cert, 
nied, 494 U.S. 1C18 (1990), decided after this 
;e was tried, we said that for subpart (q) to 
;s federal constitutional muster under the 
preme Court's decision in Godfrey v. 
orgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), "the physical 
lse must be qualitatively and quantitatively 
ferent and more culpable than that necessary 
accomplish the murder." Menzies now argues 
t the circumstances surrounding the homicide 
h which he was charged did not rise to the 
el of heinousness required by the United I 
tes Constitution as construed in Tuttle. I 
a its closing argument, the State listed the 
;ravating factors it wanted the court to 
isider and stated that one such factor was "the 
tal and heinous nature of the murder." The 
secutor, however, did not refer the court to 
"heinous" provision in section 76-5-202(1 )(q) 
the Code. When the trial court enumerated 
aggravating and mitigating factors at the time 
sentencing, it noted subpart (q). While we 
ik that it would have been error for the court 
consider subpart (q) satisfied by the facts of 
case and to use that finding as an 
ravating factor, we are not convinced that 
b an error occurred. The trial judge was 
lainly aware of our previous decisions 
iting capital murders deemed ruthless and 
tal to those "involving an aggravated battery 
torture." State v. Wood, 648 P 2d 71, S6 
in 1981) (construing and applymg Godfrey), 
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). While we 
uncomfortable with the trial judge's 
fences to subpart (q), we have no solid 
son to believe that the judge thought this was 
appropriate situation for reliance on the | 
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heinousness factor listed in 76-5-202(1 )(q). 
Furthermore, we note that the judge could 
have properly considered the nature and 
circumstances of the crime, including its 
brutality and what the prosecutor apparently 
referred to colloquially as heinousness, as an 
aggravating factor under section 76-3-207(2). In 
this guise, the various facts of the crime that 
Menzies says do not rise to the level of 
constitutional and statutory heinousness could 
still have been considered. Therefore, even if we 
were to assume that the court erred in 
considering heinousness, we think that the error 
was harmless because we "can still confidently 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
remaining aggravating circumstances and factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors and that the 
! imposition of the death penalty was justified and 
appropriate." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 
1248 (Utah), cert, denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 427 
(1993). 
Menzies next argues that the trial court erred 
by relying on victim impact evidence during the 
penalty phase in violation of article I, section 9 
of the Utah Constitution. Because Menzies did 
not object to the victim impact evidence at trial, 
we must consider this claim under a plain-error 
analysis. Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35. Again, to 
find plain error, we must find that (i) an error 
occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the 
error was harmful. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
Menzies claims that at the time of the 
sentencing phase, the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482 
U.S. 496 (1987), prevented the consideration of 
victim impact evidence as a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Because the trial judge should have 
been aware of this ruling, Menzies argues that 
an obvious error occurred when the evidence 
was considered during sentencing. 
We do not agree. In Booth, the Court's 
concern appeared to be based on the fact that 
victim impact evidence created "a 
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury 
may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner." 482 U.S. at 503. With no 
jury sitting during the penalty phase, we do not 
think that Booth's application to this case should 
have been obvious to the trial judge. Cf. State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989) 
("Erroneous admissions of evidence are not as 
critical in a bench trial as where a jury is 
involved . . . .").6 
Finally, Menzies argues that the trial court 
failed to apply the standard set forth in Wood, 
648 P.2d at 83-84, in imposing the death 
penalty. There, we held that in order to impose 
the death penalty, the sentencing body must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the substantiality 
or persuasiveness of the aggravating factors 
outweighs that of the mitigating factors, and 
must then conclude, also beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the death penalty is appropriate. Id. 
Menzies asserts that the trial court failed to 
properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
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factors and then incorrectly concluded that the 
death penalty was appropriate. We do not agree. 
The first prong of Wood requires that the 
sentencing body find that the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 648 P.2d at 83-84. While we 
realize that the trial judge recited a number of 
.factors during the sentencing proceeding, the 
record indicates that he weighed those factors in 
the manner required by Wood: 
The court has, to the best of the court's 
ability, weighed and evaluated the mitigating 
circumstances and the aggravating 
circumstances. And the conclusion the court 
has reached is that based on the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, the court 
concludes that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition, Wood requires that the sentencing 
body find that the death penalty is the 
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
648 P.2d at 84. Again, the record indicates that 
the trial judge properly apphed the law: 
Consequently, this court, with the heaviest 
of hearts, makes the more difficult and 
trying decision that under the circumstances 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, the death 
penalty is the appropriate penalty, and the 
court so orders. 
We therefore find no merit to Menzies' claim 
that the trial judge applied an inappropriate 
standard when he sentenced Menzies to death. 
Menzies also points out that the trial judge did 
not make written findings that the prior bad acts 
evidenced by material found in his prison file 
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
required by our decision in State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted 
on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 
1546 (10th Cir. 1992). While we have required 
written findings regarding unadjudicated bad acts 
if the sentence is determined by a judge, we 
have not said that such findings are 
constitutionally required and that a failure to 
make such findings mandates reversal. Id. at 
1260 n.16. Rather, we can look to the other 
evidence before the trial court to be ceruin that 
the death sentence would have been imposed 
even without the improper evidence. Id. 
Reviewing the record before us, we think that 
the error was harmless. The prior bad acts 
referred to are quite minor when compared to 
the other evidence of aggravating circumstances. 
We conclude that the facts indicate "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the remaining aggravating 
circumstances and factors outweigh the 
mitigating factors and that the imposition of the 
death penalty was justified and appropriate," 
despite the trial court's consideration of the 
prison file. See Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1248. 
Therefore, any error was harmless. See Lafferty, 
749 P.2d at 1261 (citing State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200, 204-05 & n.3 (Utah 1987)). 
We find Menzies' other claims to be without 
merit.7 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the 
jury's verdict and the trial court's subsequen 
sentence. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Russell W. Bench, Court of Appeals Judge 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
I concur in that part of the majority opinion 
that overturns the rule requiring reversal when 
a party has been compelled to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who 
should have been removed for cause. ] 
emphasize, however, that if a trial judge errs in 
not striking a juror on a for-cause challenge and 
a defendant then expends a peremptory challenge 
to remove that juror, reversal may still be 
required if the defendant can demonstrate actual 
prejudice in having lost the peremptory 
challenge. Concededly, it will be much more 
difficult to establish reversible error under this 
rule, but the cost of reversing a conviction for 
an error of the trial judge that is corrected by a 
peremptory challenge with no demonstrable 
prejudice to the defendant is too great, if not 
irrational. 
I dissent from the result and note that this case 
has been mishandled from the beginning. First, 
the transcript of the trial and penalty phase 
contains a multitude of errors, and portions of 
that transcript may be missing. This caused 
Menzies to challenge the sufficiency of the 
record for appellate review. State v. Menzies, 
845 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 1992). The Court, 
however, rejected Menzies9 assertion that the 
record was unreliable and held that the errors in 
the transcript were not prejudicial, although 
accuracy of the transcript was at best 
problematic. Id. I thought then that the case 
should have been retried, and I dissented from 
the Court's opinion. 
Defendant now asserts forty-four claims of 
error on appeal. The majority decides to address 
only six and summarily dismisses the remaining 
thirty-eight on the unexamined, conclusory 
assertion that they are all without merit. 
Althougn seme of the issues lack sufficient merit 
to require discussion, some of them raise 
substantial claims that should be addressed. For 
example, the trial court's instruction on the 
State's burden of proof was undeniably in error. 
It violated the clear ruling of this Court in State 
v. Johnson, T74 P.2d 1141, 1147^8 (Utah 
1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result, 
joined by Durham and Zimmerman, JJ.). See 
State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 
1989); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 
(1990) (per curiam) (Ujited States Supreme 
Court adopted similar position and held that 
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction in that 
case required reversal of conviction). 
The majority now addresses the issue in a 
footnote. It erroneously concludes that the 
correct rule with respect to a reasonable doubt 
instruction is not entitled to retroactive 
Code^Co 
Provo Utah 
State v. Menzies 
235 Utah Adv Rep 23 31 
application Contrary to the majority opmion, it 
is well-established law that a judicial opmion 
changing a rule of criminal law is automatically 
applied retroactively to criminal cases pending 
on direct appeal Stare v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 
583 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), 
State v. Belgard, 615 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Utah 
1980). The majority asserts that our rulings on 
the reasonable doubt instruction m Ireland and 
Johnson should not be applied retroactively to 
this case because "*the automatic rule of 
retroactivity as to nonfinal judgments only 
applies to significant changes of rules that are 
not expressly declared to be prospective m 
operation.'" Norton, 625 P.2d at 584 The 
majority asserts that a proper reasonable doubt 
instruction is a significant change that represents 
a "clear break with the past." Id. at 583. That 
assertion is incorrect. A proper reasonable doubt 
instruction has always meant "beyond" a 
reasonable doubt and has meant that for a very 
long time. 
Furthermore, neither Ireland nor Johnson 
"expressly declared" that they are to be applied 
prospectively only. The majority states that 
Ireland indicated an intent by the Court that the 
change m the reasonable doubt instruction was 
only to be applied prospectively. The language 
in Ireland that the majority refers to, however, 
was not m any way related to prospective or 
retroactive application of the decision. The 
Court stated that it had "concerns" with the 
potential effects of the instruction and that the 
instruction should no longer be given. As stated 
by the majority, a decision is automatically 
applied retroactively to nonfinal judgments 
unless we expressly declare otherwise. The 
language m Ireland cited by the majority does 
not even cite to Norton or any of our other cases 
on retroactivity. See, e.g , Belgard, 615 P.2d at 
1275. That language hardly qualifies as an 
"express declaration" of prospective application. 
Neither does Johnson expressly declare that the 
new rule has only prospective application. 
Next, I submit that it was error for the trial 
court to admit defendant's prison record m bulk. 
Due process requires that evidence submitted in 
the penalty phase of a capital homicide case 
have some degree of relevance and reliability. 
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980) 
(opinion of Wilkins, J., with Maughan, J., 
concurring m this part of the opmion, and 
Stewart, J., concurring m the judgment); see 
also Mills v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 
(Utah 1993). The trial court did not evaluate 
either the reliability or the relevance of any of 
the evidence contained in the file. Although the 
trial judge, not a jury, imposed the death 
penalty, there is no way of knowing what 
impact, if any, the documents m that file may 
have had. Truth be told, judges may also be ; 
influenced by improper evidence, and at least m | 
a death case where findings are not required, the 
state ought not submit, and the judge ought not 
admit, a whole raft of evidence, all or part of 
which should not be admitted 
Undoubtedly, there are also other issues that 
should be addressed. Nowhere is the mtegnty of 
the law more important than when a person's 
life is at stake To preserve that mtegnty, we 
have gone the extra mile m death cases and 
addressed and decided issues even though no 
proper objection was made at tnal when an error 
was manifest and prejudicial. State v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982). Now, however, 
the Court summarily disposes of over thirty 
allegations of error with the summary statement 
that they are "without ment." 
Hall, Justice, does not participate herem, 
Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
1. An area manager for Gas-A-Mat later conducted a 
more thorough accounting and determined that 
approximately $116 in cash was missing 
2. The current version of section "6-5-202 substitutes 
the term "aggravated murder" for murder in the first 
degree 
3. We note that the doctrine of stare decisis as it 
applies to a court of appeals has two facets Vertical 
stare decisis, the first of these two facets, compels a 
court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a 
higher court See J agree v Board of School Comm'rs, 
459 U S 1314, 1316 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1983), 
In re Marriage of Thurhn, 746 P 2d 929, 934 (Ariz 
Ct App 1987) Under this mandate, lower courts are 
obliged to follow the holding of a higher court, as 
well as any "judicial dicta" that may be announced by 
the higher court See Lewis v Sava, 602 F Supp 
571,573(DCNY \9%A),Fogertyv State,231 Cal 
Rptr 810, 815 (Ct App 1986), Ex parte Harrison, 
741 S W 2d 607, 608-09 (Tex Ct App 1987) See 
generally Robert E Keeton, Venturing To Do Justice 
Reforming Private Law 25-38 (1969), 21 C J S 
Courts §142, at 169-70 (1990) Horizontal stare 
decisis, the second facet, requires that a court of 
appeals follow its own prior decisions This doctrine 
applies with equal force to courts comprised of 
multiple panels, requiring each panel to observe the 
prior decisions of another State v Thurman, 846 
P 2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) Horizontal stare decisis 
does not, however, require that a panel adhere to its 
own or another panel's prior decisions with the same 
inflexibility as does vertical stare decisis See Opsal v 
Unuea Sens Auto Ass'n 283 J«il Rptr 212,216 
(Ct App 1992), State v Dugan, 718 P 2d 1010, 
1014 (Ariz Ct App 1986) Instead, although it may 
not do so lightly, a panel may overrule its own or 
anotner panel's decision where "the decision is clearly 
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render 
the prior decision inapplicable " Dugan, 718 P 2d at 
1014 
4. Rule 16(g) provides 
If at any tune during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this 
rule, the court may order such party to permit the 
discovery or mspec >r gran a continuance or 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it 
deems just under the circumstances 
5. Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in 
pertinent part 
(a) Definition of unavailability "Unavailability 
as a witness" includes situations in which the 
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declarant: 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement despite 
an order of the court to do so; 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if 
the . . . refusal . . . is due to the procurement or 
wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's 
statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a 
witness at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in 
compliance with the law in the course of the same 
or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered . . . had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination. 
Utah R. Evid. 804. 
6. in concluding that the trial court did not commit 
plain error in admitting victim impact evidence, we do 
not decide whether victim impact evidence is 
admissible under the Utah Constitution. See State v. 
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 39 n.38 (March 2, 
1994). Furthermore, in light of the fact that we 
recently held for the first time that section 76-3-207 of 
the Code prohibits the introduction of victim impact 
evidence, id. at 32-33, we cannot conclude that the 
trial court committed plain error when it admitted the 
evidence at issue here in a trial held before our recent 
pronouncement. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-
09 (Utah 1993). 
7. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart takes aim 
at the majority's failure to address each of defendant's 
forty-four claims of error. We note that the sheer 
number of errors alleged is no measure of the merits 
of those claims. The majority has dealt with those 
claims of error that are deserving of attention. 
Justice Stewart also asserts that the trial court's 
instruction on the State's burden of proof was 
undeniably in error, citing State v. Johnson, 774 p.2d 
1141,1147-48 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in 
the result, joined by Zimmerman and Durham, J J.), 
and State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 
1989). In his Johnson opinion, decided after this case 
was tried, when faced with an instruction in all 
pertinent respects identical to the instruction at issue 
here, Justice Stewart concluded that although the 
instruction was incorrect, it did "not rise to the level 
of reversible error." 774 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result, joined by Zimmerman & 
Durham, JJ.). 
More importantly, however, we note that the 
instant instruction was proper under legal principles in 
place at the time it was given. Two months before 
Meazies went to trial, this court approved a 
reasonable doubt instruction substantively identical to 
the one at issue here in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546, 572-73 (Utah 1987). It was not until one year 
after Menzies' trial that we expressed in Jchnson and 
Ireland our disapproval of the "weighty affairs" and 
"possible or imaginary" language. Despite Justice 
Stewart's suggestion to the contrary, this change in the 
law is not entitled to retroactive application under our 
holding in State v. Norton, 675 P. 2d 577 (Utah 1983), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986). In Norton, we recognized 
that "when this Court established a new rule of law on 
an essential element of a crime, a criminal defendant 
whose direct appeal was pending was entitled to the 
benefit of the new rule for the resolution of his 
appeal." Id. at 583. We went on to emphasize, 
however, that the 
automatic rule of retroactivity as to nonfinaJ 
judgments only applies to significant changes of 
rules that are not expressly declared to be 
prospective in operation. This qualification is 
necessary to prevent automatic retroactivity from 
displacing the traditional rule that a new rule of 
criminal procedure which constitutes "a clear 
break from the past" will sometimes be 
nonretroactive. 
Id. at 584 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982)). In Ireland, we 
did indicate that the change in the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt-instruction law was not to be 
retroactive. Specifically, the Ireland court's 
declaration that trial courts are to discontinue use of 
the "weighty affairs' and "possible or imaginary" 
language was made in the exercise of this court's 
supervisory power over lower courts. 773 P.2d at 
1380. This is a clear indication that we would strike 
down only future verdicts based on the offending 
language. We reemphasized our intention to do so in 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring in 
the result, joined by Zimmerman & Durham, JJ.). 
Because the invocation of our supervisory powers in 
Ireland demonstrates a commitment on the part of this 
court to prospectively prohibit the use of the offending 
language, the Ireland/Johnson rule is not entitled to 
retroactive application under our holding in Norton, 
675 P.2d at 584. 
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APPENDIX B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused-] 
In all criminal prosecutions* the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT V m 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fi"i»f imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 18- Selection of jury, 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory chal-
lenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory chal-
lenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory chal-
lenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen* 
dants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed, by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship becween the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political i subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a jfiHirnaf prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
tile juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts: 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, railing or employment, the carry-
ing on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a 
like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
tile cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chai-
.lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
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WEST VI 
KNOW WHICH, BUT I WOULDN'T HAVE RECOGNIZEDrHIs\ NAME AS A 
WITNESS, AND I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU HIS NAME. I THOUGHT 
THIS WOULD BE QUITE [PERMANENT. 
THE C0UR5-! ¥£S. 
A JUROR: JOHN SPENCER. 
tjR. JONES:. HE IS NOT A WITNESS. WE HAD A 
,EY OFFICER^ 
JUROR: WHILE I AM HERE, I ALSO WANT TO SAY 
MY HUSBAND IS RETIRED. HE IS SEMI-RETIRED. HE HAS A SMALL 
BUSINESS WHERE HE SELLS METAL DETECTORS. [TAUNI, NOTHING 
FURTHER ON THE NOTES ON THIS JUROR. JUST A BUNCH OF 
ASTERISKS??????] 
(A JUROR^LEA3ZES-TIIE JURY ROOMr 
"" - . ^ftr^UROR ENTERS THE JURY ROOM.) 
THE COURT: ROSENKRANTZ. 
A JUROR: KATHY. 
THE COURT: KATHY. HOW DID WE GET KAY? 
KATHY ROSENKRANTZ, WE APPRECIATE YOUR 
ENDURANCE IN SITTING THROUGH THE GENERAL VOIR DIRE AND THEN 
WAITING ALL THIS TIME TO BE INDIVIDUALLY QUESTIONED, AND 
THE REASON THAT WE ARE NOW AT THE STAGE OF INDIVIDUAL 
QUESTIONING IS BECAUSE WE ARE GOING TO ASK YOU QUESTIONS 
DEALING WITH THE DEATH PENALTY, AND WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO 
ANSWER FRANKLY AND HONESTLY, AND WE DIDN'T WANT WHAT YOU 
SAID TO INFLUENCE ANYBODY ELSE AND VICE VERSA. 
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ANY GENERAL QUESTIONS? 
NOW, I AM GOING TO READ TO YOU, AND IN FRONT 
OF YOU IS A SHEET OF PAPER. YOU CAN FOLLOW ALONG AS I 
READ. 
THE FIRST PART WILL EXPLAIN WHAT FIRST DEGREE 
MURDER IS. THE SECOND PART WILL EXPLAIN IT IS DIVIDED INTO 
TWO PHASES, THE GUILT PHASE AND THE PENALTY PHASE. IN THE 
GUILT PHASE IF YOU FIND A PERSON NOT GUILTY, THEN THAT IS 
ALL. IF YOU FIND HIM GUILTY, THEN IT MOVE ON TO THE SECOND 
PHASE WHICH IS THE PENALTY PHASE. 
AND IN THE PENALTY PHASE, THERE ARE A NUMBER 
OF THINGS YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER. ONE IS THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THEN WE 
WILL GO ON TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN TO 
PROVE GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AS WELL AS PROVING 
AGGRAVATING FACTORS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THAT 
BURDEN IS ON THE STATE. THAT BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS. 
FOLLOWING THAT IS A SERIES OF QUESTIONS I 
WILL ASK YOU. YOU CAN FOLLOW ALONG MY READING THE 
QUESTIONS, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU ANSWER THOSE 
QUESTIONS AS HONESTLY AND TRUTHFULLY AS YOU CAN. 
MR. MENZIES IS CHARGED WITH FIRST DEGREE 
MURDER. SPECIFICALLY, HE IS CHARGED WITH INTENTIONALLY, 
KNOWINGLY CAUSING THE DEATH OF MISS HUNSAKER WHILE 
COMMITTING, ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT, OR FLEEING FROM THE 
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1 I COMMISSION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, ROBBERY, AGGRAVATED 
2 | KIDNAPPING, OR KIDNAPPING. 
3 I SHOULD THE JURY FIND MR. MENZIES NOT GUILTY 
4 I OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER OR GUILTY OF SOME LESSER DEGREE OF 
5 I OFFENSE, THE TRIAL WILL BE CONCLUDED AND IMPOSITION OF ANY 
6 SENTENCE, IF REQUIRED BY LAW, WOULD BE LEFT TO THE COURT. 
7 IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE JURY WERE TO FIND 
8 MR. MENZIES GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, THE TRIAL WOULD 
9 EXTENT INTO A SECOND PHASE, A PENALTY PHASE, WHERE THE JURY 
10 WOULD BE REQUIRED TO RETURN A VERDICT OF LIFE IN PRISON OR 
11 DEATH. 
12 EVIDENCE DURING THE PENALTY PHASE COULD BE 
13 EXPECTED TO INCLUDE AGGRAVATING FACTORS PRESENTED IN FAVOR 
14 OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND MITIGATING FACTORS PRESENTED IN A 
15 FAVOR OF LIFE SENTENCE. 
16 AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
17 DURING THE PENALTY PHASE, THE COURT WILL INSTRUCT THE JURY 
18 THAT THE DEATH PENALTY CAN BE IMPOSED ONLY AFTER A 
19 UNANIMOUS FINDING THAT THE STATE HAS PROVED BEYOND A 
20 REASONABLE DOUBT FIRST, THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
21 OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SECOND, THAT 
22 DEATH IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY. 
23 THE JURY MUST THEN BY THIS INSTRUCTION TO THE 
24 EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE PENALTY PHASE AND RETURN A 
25 VERDICT. THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN AT THE PENALTY PHASE 
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JUST AS IT DID AT THE GUILT PHASE AT THE TRIAL. THIS 
BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS TO THE DEFENDANT. 
QUESTION ONE, HOW TO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE DEATH 
PENALTY? 
A JUROR: I'VE NEVER REALLY FORMED A FIRM 
OPINION ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, TO BE TRUTHFUL WITH YOU. 
THE COURT: ANY REASON WHY — 
A JUROR: I DON'T KNOW. I JUST HAVEN'T 
THOUGHT ABOUT IT THAT MUCH OR EVER. I CAN SAY THAT I GUESS 
IF I HAD TO SWAY MORE HEAVILY ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, I WOULD 
PROBABLY SWAY MORE HEAVILY TO THE DEATH PENALTY. 
THE COURT: HAVE YCU EVER SHARED WITH ANYONE 
ELSE YOUR FEELINGS ON THE DEATH PENALTY? 
A JUROR: NOT THAT I SPECIFICALLY RECALL, 
UNLESS IT WAS MY HUSBAND FOR SOME REASON OR ANOTHER. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE DEATH 
PENALTY EVER CHANGED? 
A JUROR: NO. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU PRESENTLY IRREVOCABLY 
COMMITTED TO WHAT PENALTY A PERSON CONVICTED OF FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER SHOULD RECEIVE? 
A JUROR: NO. 
THE COURT: SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A PENALTY 
PHASE, WOULD YOU FOLLOW THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS AND VOTE 
FOR THE DEATH PENALTY ONLY IF THE STATE HAS PROVED BEYOND A 
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1 I REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
2 I OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT THE DEATH 
3 PENALTY IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY? 
4 A JUROR: YES. 
5 THE COURT: DO YOU BELIEVE ALL PERSONS 
6 CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER SHOULD BE PUT TO DEATH? 
7 A JUROR: I GUESS I WOULD, IF THEY HAVE BEEN 
8 CONVICTED OF THAT CRIME. 
9 THE COURT: UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DO YOU 
10 FEEL PUTTING SOMEONE TO DEATH IS WARRANTED? 
11 A JUROR: WELL, IF THEY HAVE BEEN FOUND 
12 GUILTY BEYOND, I GUESS WHAT THE COURT FEELS, A SHADOW OR A 
13 DOUBT, THEN I GUESS THAT IS A JUST PENALTY. IF THEY HAVE 
14 BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF MURDER. 
15 THE COURT: NOW, DO YOU UNDERSTAND THERE ARE 
16 TWO PHASES TO IT, THE GUILT PHASE AND THE PENALTY PHASE? 
17 A JUROR: YES. 
18 THE COURT: ON THE PENALTY PHASE, THERE ARE 
19 TWO PHASES, THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE 
20 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. AND YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER THE 
21 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, 
22 AND THEN IF THE STATE PROVES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE 
23 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THEN YOU MAY IMPOSE OR BRING 
24 BACK A VERDICT OF THE DEATH PENALTY, IF YOU FIND THAT THAT 
25 IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE SENTENCE; DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
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A JUROR: YES. 
THE COURT: IF THE STATE DOESN'T PROVE BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THEN THE 
OTHER VERDICT THAT MAY BE BROUGHT BACK IS THE LIFE 
SENTENCE; DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
A JUROR: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: BROKEN UP INTO TWO PARTS. CAN 
YOU CONSIDER THOSE THINGS? 
A JUROR: YES, I COULD. 
THE COURT: IF I INSTRUCT YOU, WILL YOU DO 
THAT? 
A JUROR: YES, I WOULD. 
THE COURT: I HAD SOME CONFUSION WITH NUMBEI 
7 AND 8 
A JUROR: YES, I WOULD CONSIDER THAT. 
16 | THE COURT: I FOUND THERE IS SOME CONFUSION 
17 I WHEN FIRST DEGREE MURDER IS CONCERNED BECAUSE OF THE 
18 RESPONSE THAT YOU GAVE. 
19 DO YOU BELIEVE THE DEATH PENALTY IS 
2 0 ORDINARILY PROPER PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE 
21 MURDER? 
22 A JUROR: YES. 
23 THE COURT: IF THE JURY SHOULD CONVICT MR. 
24 MENZIES OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WOULD YOU BE ABLE TO 
25 I CONSIDER VOTING FOR A SENTENCE LESS THAN DEATH? 
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1 I A JUROR: YES, I COULD CONSIDER IT. 
2 I THE COURT: IS LIFE IN PRISON A SEVERE 
3 PENALTY IN YOUR OPINION? 
4 A JUROR: YES, I THINK IT'S SEVERE. 
5 THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND A LIFE 
6 TERM IN PRISON TO MEAN? 
7 A JUROR: NEVER AGAIN TO LEAVE THE PRISON. 
8 THE COURT: WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH 
9 PENALTY IN ORDER TO ENSURE NO RELEASE FROM PRISON EVER 
10 OCCURRED? 
11 A JUROR: YES. 
12 THE COURT: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT OUR CURRENT 
13 SYSTEM OF RELEASING CONVICTED PERSONS FROM PRISON ON PAROLE 
14 AFTER APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF PARDONS? 
15 A JUROR: THAT IS SOMETHING ELSE I HAVEN'T 
16 REALLY GIVEN MUCH THOUGH TO, I GUESS. HERE AGAIN, TALKING 
17 I ABOUT CONVICTED — PERSONS CONVICTED OF MURDER. I DON'T 
18 I THINK THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED. I GUESS I AM NOT IN 
19 AGREEMENT WITH — DO I MAKE MYSELF CLEAR? I DON'T THINK 
2 0 THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM PRISON IF THEY HAVE BEEN 
21 CONVICTED OF MURDER. 
22 THE COURT: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A LIFE 
23 SENTENCE SHOULD ACCOMPLISH THE GOAL OF REPEATED CRIMINAL 
24 ACTIVITY THE SAME WAY AS THE DEATH PENALTY? 
25 I A JUROR: IT COULD BE AS LONG AS THEY WERE 
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NEVER RELEASED. 
THE COURT: DO YOU SEE ANY CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE TEACHINGS OF YOUR RELIGION? 
A JUROR: I THINK THERE COULD BE A CONFLICT 
THERE. 
THE COURT: COULD YOU EXPLAIN THE CONFLICT? 
A JUROR: WELL, OF COURSE, NOW THAT I THINK 
ABOUT IT, I THINK THE CONFLICT WOULD COME IN THE TERMS OF 
SHEDDING THE BLOOD OF AN INNOCENT MAN,SO I HONESTLY DON'T 
KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE VIEW POINTS OF MY RELIGION ARE ON 
THAT — ON THIS SUBJECT. 
THE COURT: NOW, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU ARE IN 
A POSITION AT THIS STAGE TO SIT IN ON A JURY THAT MAY 
IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY AND FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH WHAT YOU 
FEEL YOUR RELIGION TEACHES IN REGARDS TO THAT? 
A JUROR: YES, I THINK I COULD. 
THE COURT: WHAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD THERE 
BE, IF ANY, BETWEEN WHAT THE VICTIM SUFFERED AND WHAT THE 
PERSON THAT CAUSED THAT SHOULD SUFFER? 
A JUROR: WELL — 
THE COURT: DO YOU FEEL THERE IS ANY 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VICTIM AND THE PERSON WHO MAY HAVE 
CAUSED THE VICTIM TO SUFFER AND HOW EACH OF THEM SHOULD 
RESPECTIVELY SUFFER, ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO? 
A JUROR: I DON'T THINK SO. 
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1 THE COURT: ARE YOU WILLING TO CONSIDER 
2 EVIDENCE WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT AND A LIFE 
3 SENTENCE SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A PENALTY PHASE? 
4 A JUROR: YES. 
5 THE COURT: IF A PERSON WERE TO BE CONVICTED 
6 OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WHAT INFORMATION WOULD YOU THEN 
7 LIKE TO KNOW BEFORE MAKING A DECISION AS TO A PENALTY? 
8 THIS IS WHERE WE HAVE GONE PASSED THE GUILT 
9 PHASE, PENALTY PHASE, AND WE ARE CONSIDERING MITIGATING AND 
10 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
11 A JUROR: I THINK I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT 
12 REALLY DROVE THIS PERSON TO THIS SEVERE CRIME, WHAT LED UP 
13 TO IT, ANY DETAILS LIKE THAT. 
14 THE COURT: DO YOU BELIEVE A PERSON CAN 
15 CHANGE AND BECOME BETTER OVER TIME? 
16 A JUROR: YES. 
17 THE COURT: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE 
18 PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION? 
19 A JUROR: I DON'T KNOW THAT MUCH ABOUT IT, 
2 0 BUT I FEEL THAT PSYCHIATRISTS ARE NECESSARY AND HELPFUL FOR 
21 ALL I KNOW ABOUT IT. 
22 THE COURT: CAN SOCIAL WORKERS, PSYCHOLOGISTS 
23 HELP PEOPLE TO CHANGE? 
24 A JUROR: I THINK SO. 
25 THE COURT: DOES THE FACT THAT QUESTIONS 
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1 CONCERNING THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE BEEN ASKED RAISE DOUBTS 
2 IN YOUR MIND AS TO THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT OF MR. MENZIES? 
3 A JUROR: THUS FAR, NO. 
4 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS THAT YC 
5 MIGHT BE CRITICIZED FOR NOT IMPOSING A DEATH PENALTY? 
6 A JUROR: NO. 
7 THE COURT: WHAT WOULD BE YOUR FEELINGS ABOI] 
8 SERVING ON A JURY WHOSE FUNCTION IS TO TRY A FIRST DEGREE 
9 MURDER CASE WHERE IF THE PERSON IS CONVICTED, YOU WILL HAV 
10 TO CONSIDER IMPOSITION OF A DEATH SENTENCE? 
11 A JUROR: I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE REAL 
12 EASY, COME REAL EASY, BUT, YOU KNOW, THIS IS THE LAW. THI 
13 IS SERVING JUSTICE. I WOULD — I THINK I COULD FEEL GOOD 
14 ABOUT WHATEVER DECISION HAD TO BE MADE. 
15 MR. JONES: NO QUESTIONS. 
16 MS. WELLS: MISS ROSENKRANTZ, MAY I CALL YOU 
17 ATTENTION TO QUESTION NUMBER 13. AND JUST ASK YOU IF YOU 
18 WOULD READ THAT OVER REAL QUICKLY. 
19 AND YOUR ORIGINAL ANSWER TO THAT WAS THAT YO 
20 WOULD. AND I GUESS I WOULD LIKE TO NARROW THE FOCUS OF 
21 THAT QUESTION WITH YOU A LITTLE BIT AND SEE IF DURING A 
22 PENALTY PHASE, ASSUMING THAT WE WERE THERE, AND YOU WERE 
23 GIVEN INFORMATION THAT OTHERWISE WOULD NOT LEAD YOU TO VOT 
24 FOR THE DEATH PENALTY, BUT YOU WERE CONCERNED THAT 
25 SOMEWHERE DOWN THE ROAD, THE BOARD OF PARDONS MAY RELEASE 
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1 THIS PERSON. 
2 WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY JUST TO 
3 ENSURE THAT THE PERSON WAS NOT EVER RELEASED FROM PRISON? 
4 A JUROR: WELL, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, I 
5 MAY NOT. I GUESS IT'S HARD FOR ME TO SAY DEFINITELY RIGHT 
6 NOW. 
7 MS. WELLS: DO YOU STILL CONSIDER THAT THAT 
8 WOULD BE A FACTOR THAT YOU WOULD LOOK AT IN DECIDING 
9 BETWEEN DEATH AND LIFE? 
10 A JUROR: YES. 
11 MS. WELLS: THAT IS KNOWING THE RAMIFICATIONS 
12 THAT DEATH WOULD MEAN DEATH, BUT LIFE MIGHT NOT MEAN LIFE? 
13 A JUROR: YES. 
14 MS. WELLS: THAT IS ALL. 
15 THE COURT: ON THE QUESTION OF NO RELEASE 
16 FROM PRISON EVER OCCURRED, WE DISCUSSED THE TWO PHASES, THE 
17 I GUILT PHASE AND THE PENALTY PHASE. THE PENALTY PHASE IS 
18 I AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
19 AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN TO GO PROVE 
20 A REASONABLE DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES? 
21 A JUROR: YES. 
22 THE COURT: AND IF THEY DO THAT, THEN YOU MAY 
23 BRING BACK A VERDICT THAT IS APPROPRIATE, THE PENALTY OF 
24 DEATH. 
25 I A JUROR: YES. 
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MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR, COULD THE COURT 
CLARIFY, AGAIN, THE TWO-PRONGED TEST, THAT IT BE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT IT BE THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY. 
THE COURT: DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
A JUROR: YES. 
THE COURT: THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY. 
AND THEN IF THE STATE FAILS TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND IF YOU FIND THAT 
THAT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE — OR YOU DO NOT FIND THAT 
THAT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE PENALTY, THEN YOU GO TO THE 
MITIGATING SIDE. 
A JUROR: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: THE MITIGATING SIDE IS THE LIFE 
SENTENCE. 
A JUROR: YES. 
THE COURT: AND THAT IS WHAT THE LAW SAYS, 
DIVIDED INTO THOSE TWO. AND IF THE STATE FAILS TO PROVE 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, 
COULD YOU IMPOSE THE LIFE SENTENCE? 
MOMENT, 
CAUSE, 
, AND 
AND 
A JUROR: YES. 
THE COURT: 
WE WILL CALL 
COULD YOU JUST STEP 
YOU RIGHT 
(A JUROR LEAVES THE 
MS. WELLS: 
THE REASON FOR 
WE WOULD 
THAT IS 
BACK IN. 
JURY ROOM 0 
OUT ONE 
ENTER A CHALLENGE FOR 
THE JUROR INDICATED THAT 
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SHE WOULD CONSIDER VOTING FOR THE DEATH PENALTY IN, ORDER TO 
ENSURE NO RELEASE FROM PRISON EVER OCCURRED. 
UNDER THE STATUTE, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THAT 
WOULD FALL INTO THE NATURE OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, 
THAT ONE COULD CONSIDER EXACTLY HOW TO FORMULATE THAT, BUT 
I THINK THAT STATE'S/THE BASIS FOR THE ARGUMENT. 
MR. JONES: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE PROBLEM 
WITH THAT, AGAIN, WE ARE PUTTING ONE QUESTION OUT OF 
CONTEXT. IF YOU RECALL HER ANSWER TO QUESTION NUMBER 6, 
SHE SAID SHE WOULD FOLLOW THE STANDARD. 
SHE WOULD REQUIRE US TO PROVE THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE 
PENALTY QUESTIONS, SHE SAID SHE WOULD CONSIDER A SENTENCE 
LESS THAN DEATH. SHE SAID SHE WOULD CONSIDER EVIDENCE 
WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE LIFE 
SENTENCE. 
CERTAINLY, THERE ARE A LOT OF FACTORS THAT A 
19 I JURY CAN CONSIDER IN TRYING TO DECIDE WHETHER TO IMPOSE A 
20 DEATH SENTENCE OR LIFE IN PRISON. WHILE THAT MAY BE ONE OF 
21 THE FACTORS SHE LOOKED AT, SHE STILL IS WILLING TO FOLLOW 
22 THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LAW AS IT APPLIES TO IMPOSING A 
23 DEATH SENTENCE. 
24 THE COURT: BASED ON HER RESPONSES TO THE 
25 I VARIOUS QUESTIONS, THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT SHE 
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1 WOULD CONSIDER ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND TRY THE CASE PROVEI 
2 BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
3 ONLY IF APPROPRIATE THAT SHE WOULD IMPOSE — BRING BACK A 
4 VERDICT OF DEATH. OTHERWISE, SHE WOULD CONSIDER MITIGATI* 
5 CIRCUMSTANCES AND BRING BACK A VERDICT OF LIFE IN PRISON. 
6 SO DENY THE MOTION FOR CAUSE. 
7 IF YOU CAN BRING HER BACK IN. 
8 (A JUROR ENTERS THE JURY ROOM.) 
9 THE COURT: IF WE CAN JUST HAVE YOU WAIT 
10 OUTSIDE OF THE JURY ROOM, WE HAVE JUST A FEW OTHER 
11 QUESTIONS WITH YOU. OTHERWISE, HOPEFULLY, WE WILL FINISH 
12 BY 5:00. 
13 (A JUROR LEAVES THE JURY ROOM.) 
14 (A JUROR ENTERS THE JURY ROOM.) 
15 THE COURT: LINDA SANDSTROM. 
16 A JUROR: THAT'S RIGHT. 
17 THE COURT: WE APPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE IN 
18 WAITING THROUGH THE GENERAL VOIR DIRE, AND NOW, WE ARE INT 
19 THE INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE. 
20 THE REASON WE HAVE THIS IS WE WANT TO ASK YO 
21 QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DEATH PENALTY, SO WE DIDN'T WANT 
22 ANYTHING THAT YOU MAY RESPOND TO TO AFFECT THE OTHER JUROR 
23 AND VICE VERSA. 
24 A JUROR: I SEE. 
25 THE COURT: BEFORE WE START ON THAT, YOU 
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HERE BEFORE THAT TIME SO THAT WE CAN RESUME ON TIME, WE 
• : r
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 i 
WILL START WITH THE OPENING STATEMENTS, AND THEN W£ WILL 
PROCEED AS I INDICATED WHEN I WAS EXPLAINING TO YOU THE 
PROCEDURES THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW. 
I S THERE ANY OTHER MATTERS THAT WE SHOULD 
HANDLE AT THIS TIME! ,. 
MR. JONES-; NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IF NOT, I JUST WANT TO ADMONISH 
YOU, AGAIN, THAT YOU ARE NOT TO TALK WITH ANY ONE REGARDING 
THIS CASE, FAMILY MEMBERS, RELATIVES OR NEIGHBORS OR ANYONE 
ELSE. 
IF ANYONE SHOULD APPROACH YOU, TELL THEM THAT 
YOU ARE ON JURY DUTY AND YOU CANNOT TALK ABOUT THIS CASE. 
IF THEY SHOULD PERSIST, WALK AWAY AND REPORT THAT TO THE 
COURT, AND PLEASE DO NOT EXPOSE YOURSELF TO ANY PUBLICITY 
FROM TELEVISION, RADIO, NEWSPAPERS OR ANYTHING ELSE. IS 
THAT UNDERSTOOD? 
IF THERE IS NONE — IF THERE IS ANYONE THAT 
v C ~* ~t "• * 
DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND. 
THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW NO ONE HAS RAISED 
THEIR HAND. SO YOU MAY BE EXCUSED FOR THIS EVENING. 
(JURY IS EXCUSED.) 
YV. ;- h 
MS-r-WBLLS: YOUR HONOR, WE NEED FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF THE RECORD THE JURY — YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD JUST 
LIKE THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE NOT WAIVING OUR 
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CAUSE CHALLENGES THAT WE PREVIOUSLY MADE TO JURORS UPON 
WHICH WE DID NOT EXERCISE OUR PRE-EMPTORY CHALLENGES. I 
THINK SPECIFICALLY ALTERNATE NUMBER 1 , THAT WE DID NOT 
EXERCISE A PRE-EMPTORY ON THAT. WE DID CHALLENGE FOR 
CAUSE. WE ARE NOT WAIVING THAT ON AN APPEAL ISSUE. 
BUT THE REASON THAT WE DID NOT DO THAT IS 
GIVEN THE ENTIRE POOL THAT WE HAD BEFORE US, IT WAS OUR 
DECISION THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE OTHERS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE 
OFF GIVEN THEIR ORDER AND THE ENTIRE SITUATION. 
WE WOULD ALSO LIKE THE COURT TO NOTE FOR THE 
RECORD THAT THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT OUR FOUR CAUSE 
MOTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE JURORS HAS CAUSED US TO 
EXERCISE ON THOSE SAME JURORS. I BELIEVE TSERE ARE EIGHT 
OF THEM THAT WE BELIEVE WE EXERCISED PRE-EMPTORIES ON THAT 
WE ORDINARILY WOULD NOT HAVE IF THE COURT HAD GRANTED OUR 
MOTIONS AND, IN FACT, THE DEFENSE ENDS UP HAVING FOUR PRE-
EMPTORY CHALLENGES THAT WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE IN A 
CAPITAL CASE. 
AND SO. WE BELIEVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF 
DOING THAT HAS CREATED AN UNFAIR — HAS CREATED PROBLEMS 
WITH US EXERCISING TO-HAVE A'FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY 
BECAUSE WE ARE LIMITED TO FOUR PRE-EMPTORIES. 
1 X i l M W W W * \ A • 
MR. JONES: 
THE COURT: 
4» A A M m* X £ ^ X M • 
NO RESPONSE. 
OKAY. IT WILL BE NOTED FOR THE 
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APPENDIX E 
IF SHE COULD FE FAIR A»:D IMPARTIAL PECAUST SHE WAS WORRYING 
APOUT THAT. IF THE COURT W&NTS TO EXPLORE THAT UITH HEP, THAT 
IG FINE, PUT I WOULD MAKE- A MOT 10!: TO EXCUSE HFR. 
MP. JONES: WHY DON'T WE WAIT AND SEE. 
. MS. WELLS: SIXTY-EICHT IS THE WOMA?.' WMC 
INDICATED AS f QUESTION AROSE REGARDINC PHOTOGRAPHS, SHE DIDf'T 
KHOW IF SHE WOULD BE APLE TO TAKE THAT OR SOMETHING LIKE THMT" 
THJTHAT EFFECT. MOW, BASED UPON THAT ALO?JE, IT SFEMS THAT IT 
WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO REMOVE HER FOR CAUSE. 
MR. JONES: WHY DOfT YOU TAKr THAT UNDER 
ADVISEMENT. 
THE COURT: T?KE UHGRICHT, HEIDI MILLER, SU£M! 
MEALD, KAY TURNER UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR, WE WERFN'T OH THF 
RECO»D EARLIER WHEW WE HAD SOME SIMILAR CONCERNS PBOUT PFOPLF, 
AMD HOW IT MIGHT DEVELOP, ANr I PRORABLY SHOULD MAKE A RECORD 
ON THAT RIGHT NOW AS TO WHICH OTHER OMES THE DEFENSE WOULD MOVE 
TO CHALLENGE FOP CAUSE THAT HAVE KOT BEEN TAKFK OFF. 
. . I BELIEVE WE MOVED OR WOULD MOVE AT TKIS TIMF 
BASED UPON^PREVIOUS ANSWERS KUMFEB 74, WHICH IS MISS WAGSTAFF. 
SHE IS THE OME WHO OWNS THE CONVENIENCE STORE WITH HER HUSPAKC 
WHICH HAS SEEN THE VICTIM OT RECENT ROBBERIES OR AGGRAVATED 
R03EERIES. 
WE ALSO PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AND WOULD 
FORMALLY MOVE TO EXCUSE MISS STROUD, MUMPER 21, FOR CAUSE. SHE 
2f9 
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IS THE Oil'*, THAT HAP P LONC ASSOCIATION WITH OR CLOSE 
ASSOCIATION WITH A NUNFER OF POLICE OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY 
MEMBERS OF THE SALT L*KE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEFAPTMENT. 
MR. BARBER, NUMPER PI, IS THE ONE WHO, I 
GUESS, LIVED NEXT DOOR TO ^  SALT LAKE COUN'TY SHERIFF'S DEPUTY, 
AND TH?T DEPUTY IS RELATED TO ONE OF THE WITNESSES IN THIS 
CASE, TO DETECTIVE JUDD. HE IS ALSO RELATED TO ANOTHER PERSON 
ON THE COUNTY NARCOTICS FORCE, SO WE WOULD HOVE TO EXCUSE 
NUMBER 81. 
I THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE TO DO THESE NOW. IT 
MAY PE THAT WE DON'T GET TO THESE PERSONS, BUT ON THE OTHER 
HAND WE MICHT, AND SO I THINK IT'S PROPER TO BRING THOSE. 
WE DISCUSSED J^OELEMS SURROUNDING fJ\ts~'MILLER 
/yME. RINOUEST, MR. WILDE, PUT THOSE HAVE — WE WON'T FORMALLY 
MOVE TO EXCUSE THEM AT THIS TIME. 
It 
r 
li 
i< 
?t 
2} 
23 
2\ 
24 
THE OTHER ONES, I THINK, JUST SUBJECT TO SOME 
INDIVIDUAL CUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY MISS ERICKSON REGARDING HER 
MEDICAL CONDITION AND HFR RELIGIOUS VIEWS. 
\ THE COURT: IS THAT IT? 
THE CLERK: THEY ARE ALL UNDER ADVISFMENT. 
/ MS. WELLS: ONE OF THEM WE TOOK OFF THAT 
/ 0 ^ 
WAS j / DIDN'T WE DECIDE TO, SORENSEN? 
THE COURT: ARE WE READY? 
MS. WELLS: JUDGE, BEFORE WE BEGIN THIS, COUL1 
> PERHAPS VERY ERIEFLY WE DISCUSS THE FORMAT THAT THIS IS GOING 
27P! 
APPENDIX F 
INSTRUCTION NO. l ^ 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
vor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
asonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
ate to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
w by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason 
d one which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Proof 
yond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies 
e mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to 
t conscientiously upon it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
asonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
e evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
If after an impartial consideration and comparison of all 
e evidence in the case you can candidly say that you are not 
tisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt, 
t if after such impartial consideration and comparison of all 
5 evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding 
aviction of the defendant's guilt such as you will be willing to 
t upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to 
IT own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
ibt must be a real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely 
ssible or imaginary. 
